Maintaining Crimean Tatar identity in the face of Russian imperialism

Abstract

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin's War of Choice in Ukraine has brought questions about Russian colonialism to the forefront. In particular, the war has raised issues concerning the cultural identities of Ukrainians and Russians, although there are many ethic groups in the region. One of these groups is the Crimean Tatars, a minority group of indigenous ethnic Turks, who have a long history of subjection to Russian Chauvinism. This paper will look at colonization’s effects on the Crimean Tatars in the past and present through a literature review. Notably, the paper will review information from the Soviet Union to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and demonstrate how Russian Imperialism has shaped modern Crimean Tatar identity. It provides a lens for further analysis of what actions may be taken to restore the Crimean Tatars' identity.

Introduction

The Crimean Tatars are the indigenous people of Crimea, a Turkic ethnic group with deep historical roots in the Crimean Peninsula. Predominantly Sunni Muslims, they have endured centuries of occupation and repression. Following Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1783, Crimea was annexed, forcing many Crimean Tatars to flee to the Ottoman Empire (Crimean Tatar Resource Center [CTRC], n.d.). Although they began to reemerge in the late 19th century, their resurgence was violently disrupted in 1944 when the Soviet government, under false accusations of Nazi collaboration, deported over 191,000 Crimean Tatars. Nearly half perished during the forced relocation to Siberia and Central Asia (CTRC, n.d.).

It took roughly two decades for the first Crimean Tatars to be allowed to return to their homeland by Soviet authorities. After returning to the Crimean Peninsula, their population steadily grew in the following decades. However, they remain a minority, comprising only 13% of Crimea’s population (Mayer, 2023). In modern times, the Crimean Tatars have been vocal supporters of an independent Ukraine and strongly opposed Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, which led to renewed repression (Kalin, 2022). Despite their expressed desire to be Ukrainian, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and others assert that Russian President Vladimir Putin is disproportionately conscripting Crimean Tatars, up to 90% in some cases, to fight in Ukraine, a tactic viewed as a form of passive genocide (Kalin, 2022). Consequently, many Crimean Tatars flee their homeland again (Kalin, 2022).

Discussion

It is impossible to discuss Crimean Tatars without discussing the 1944 deportations. With no notice, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered the removal of the entire Crimean Tatar population from the Crimean Peninsula for alleged collaboration with the German invaders (Green 2022). In less than three days, an estimated 200,000 Crimean Tatars were forcibly loaded onto boxcars and deported primarily to Central Asia (Finnin 2022). The majority of Crimean Tatars, roughly 84%, were deported to Uzbekistan (Lillis 2014). About half of them are estimated to have died during the deportation and aftermath of the inhumane conditions in the settlement camps (Green 2022). Additionally, abuse from the NKVD, the Soviet Secret police agency, was responsible for additional Crimean Tatar deaths (Finnin 2022). The Russian’s action was nothing short of a targeted ethnic cleansing; Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Canada have all recognized Stalin’s brutal deportation as a crime of genocide or cultural genocide (Green 2022).

The expression Crimean Tatars use to describe Stalin’s 1944 deportation is “Sürgün,” which means exile implying that Crimean Tatars have always considered Crimea their homeland (Finnin 2022). The suffering of the Crimean Tatars began long before 1944. The Crimean Tatars controlled the Crimean Khanate from 1441 to 1783 despite conflicts with Moscow. In the late 1700s, about 300,000 Crimean Tatars, roughly 30% of the population, left for the Ottoman Empire in response to Russian rule (Potichnyj 1975). The Russo-Turkish War (1807-1811) and the Crimean War (1855 - 1863) caused a further exodus. Eventually, the Crimean Tatars became a minority in Crimea; in 1783, they comprised 98% of the population, but by 1897, they were 34.1% (Potichnyj 1975). During this time, the Russian government also encouraged the Russification of Crimea (Potichnyj 1975). By 1917, the population of the Crimean Peninsula was 50% Russian, 25% Ukrainian, and only 25% Crimean Tatars (Potichnyj 1975). The 1920s Soviet nationality policy saw many Crimean Tatar leaders exiled or executed. In 1929, 30,000 – 40,000 Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals or Siberia, and during the manufactured famine of 1931-1934, thousands more perished (Potichnyj 1975). Following the 1944 deportation, the Crimean Tatars accounted for 0% of the population (Lublin 2014).

In 1967, the USSR decreed that the Crimean Tatars were rehabilitated; they could once again be Russian citizens, have political rights, and re-establish themselves with the Tatar language (Vardys 1971). However, the Tartars did not regain their autonomous republic, and the decrees only provided for the emancipation of individual Tartars; although their rights were restored, their national-ethnic rights were not, and even the designation Crimean was omitted (Vardys 1971). More importantly, Russia did not provide a means for the Tatars to return (Potichnyj 1975). By the end of 1968, only 148 families had been legally allowed to return. Fed up, many Crimean Tatars returned without permission but were brutally pushed back (Potichnyj 1975). After much negotiation and diplomacy, it was not until 1989 that large numbers of Crimean Tatars began returning (Zerkalo 2022). Between 1989 and 2001, the population of Crimean Tatars rose from 1.6% to 12%; in contrast, the Crimean Tatar population in Uzbekistan decreased by 95% (Lillis 2014).

The Russian attitude toward Crimea changed in the absence of the Crimean Tatars. To the average Soviet citizen, the image of Crimea transformed from a warm place to a tropical paradise (Williams 2001, 391). Old Crimean Tatar hamlets became new Russian sanatoriums, and tourist guides emphasized Crimea’s natural beauty with scant references to the Crimean Tatars (Williams 2001, 408). When Crimean Tatars were mentioned, they were portrayed as uncivilized barbarians who inhabited the Crimean Peninsula a millennium ago (Williams 2001, 409). For example, the Bahcesaray Palace, once home to the Khan of the Crimean Khanate, was reduced to a tourist site dedicated to Russian Aleksandr Pushkin’s poem, the Fountain of Tears, about a Polish princess forced into the Khan's haram (Williams 2001, 409).

The return of Crimean Tatars in the 1980s reinforced these perceptions. Many returning Crimean Tatars took part in seizures of marginal lands, while others set up squatter communities; both clashed with Soviet authorities (Williams 2015). These actions would reinforce the biases Soviets held. However, in reality, the actions of Crimean Tatars were simply a reaction to the Soviets refusing to provide land on which to settle. As a result, Crimean Tatars were forced to claim land and go so far as to set up tents to claim it (Zerkalo 2022). The sight of thousands of Crimean Tatars arriving suddenly and setting up tents reinforced the Soviet notion of Crimean Tatars as Mongolian barbarians (Williams 2001, 409).

In 1954, Crimea was transferred to Soviet Ukraine and in 1991, Ukraine became an independent country (Green 2022). Crimean Tatar leaders favored an independent Ukraine (Williams 2001, 441) while Russians raged at the notion of Crimea as part of an independent Ukraine (Green 2022). In return for their support, Kyiv supported several non-secessionist Tatar political bodies to counterweight Russian political successionist activity, leaving many Russians feeling the new Ukrainian government preferred Crimean Tatars over them. (Williams 2001, 441). The Russian-controlled Oblast authorities in Crimea undertook a referendum to reestablish Crimea as an Autonomous Republic nominally under Ukraine (Williams 2001, 441). The overwhelming support the referendum prompted the Ukrainian government to create an Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which utilized their power to quash the rights of Crimean Tatars (Williams 2001, 441).

In 1994, Yuri Meshkov was elected President of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, running on a platform to return Crimea to Russia (Coomarasamy 2014). After winning the election, Meshkov met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Coomarasamy 2014), who dismissed Meshkov’s request to rejoin Russia stating he did not want to compromise Russia’s standing with the West (Coomarasamy 2014). Meshkov’s separatist activities cause him to be removed from office (Williams 1993, 441). Subsequently, the position of President of Crimea was eliminated (Coomarasamy 2014). However, severe damage had already been done.

Meshkov’s tenure unleashed Russian nationalism in Crimean Russians. When discussing Russian nationalism, it is appropriate to note that it comes in two separate forms. The first view is that all people previously residing in the USSR or Russian Empire are Russians (Hale 2014). The second considers race and ethnicity, seeking to rid Russia of ono-Slavic elements (Hale 2014). In the second instance, Russian nationalists want immigration quotas on specific ethnic groups, favoring the return of “stranded Russians.” It is the latter form of nationalism that has had a vastly negative impact on the Crimean Tatar community.

In reviewing the political culture of the 1990s, a relationship between Mershkov’s doctrine and the current bigotry directed toward Crimean Tatars can be seen. Meshkov founded Crimea’s largest political party, the Republican Party of Crimea (RPK), which promoted the protection of the Russian language and the protection of Crimea’s Slavic population instead of focusing on special privileges for ethnic Russians (Dawson 1997). According to the RPK, these sacred aspects of Russian life and culture were under attack by a growing Crimean Tatar population (Dawson 1997). For the first time, Meshkov mobilized Russian fears of Crimean Tatars into a coherent political platform and party.

Compounding native Russian politics was politics within Russia. Although Meshkov found himself rebuffed, the climate in Russia changed with the rise of Vladimir Putin, who was entirely receptive to recognizing Crimea as Russian (Coomarasamy 2014). This change influenced Crimea’s Russian majority, most of whom received information from Russian news. Russian news sources began pushing a narrative of victimhood driven by the Ukrainian government (Charron 2016) and that Crimea was intangible, a part of Russian civilization (Free 2023), making Russians feel they had a responsibility to suppress those they saw as foreign occupiers and oppressors. This false narrative permitted the Russian government to impose a fierce crackdown on Tatars.

During the 1990s, the Crimean Tatars organized into two political organizations (Dawson 1997, 434). The Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND) adopted a confrontational stance towards government authorities and refused to compromise on issues regarding Crimean Tatar sovereignty (Dawson 1997, 434). In contrast, the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NDKT) focused on working within the system favoring compromise over confrontation (Dawson 1997, 434). Due to their contrary methods, OKND and NDKT are oppositional to each other, with OKND being the dominant political organization in Crimean Tatar politics (Dawson 1997, 434).

Following the independence of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars organized a general congress known as The Second Kurultai to discuss issues related to Crimean Tatars (Dawson 1997, 434). Although all Crimean Tatars could participate in the Second Kurultai, the NDKT refused to send delegates (Dawson 1997, 434). From this congress, the Crimean Tatars selected an executive committee known as the Mejlis (Adler 2022), whose function is to restore the rights of Crimean Tatars (Coalson 2014). The OKND/Mejlis stress cultural separatism, focusing on rebuilding a distinct sense of Crimean Tatar identity, including restoring religion and language (Dawson 1997, 434). Despite a rough start with the new government of Ukraine, the Mejlis was legalized in 1999 (Coalson 2014). Consequently, Crimean Tatars finally gained a voice within Crimea under the Ukrainian government.

The exile of the Crimean Tatars has had a profound effect on their identity. Accounts of life in exile vary amongst Crimean Tatars. Those that were deported to Kazakhstan and the Mari Republic report being well treated, those sent to labor camps in Siberia reported barely surviving, and those that were sent to Uzbekistan (the majority) reported mixed treatment (Williams 2001). Often the deportees lived in simple and harsh conditions. For example, 15-year-old Rauf Ibragimov recalled his family living in a windowless mud hut on a collective farm working the fields during the day and sleeping on the bare floor at night (Lillis 2014). The harsh physical conditions faced by Crimean Tatars enhanced their sense of Russian persecution.

Crimean Tatars did not face persecution from Russians alone. Before they arrived in Uzbekistan in the 1940s, the NKVD launched a widespread propaganda campaign linking Crimean Tatars to the Nazis (Williams 2001, 391). This compounded with Uzbek xenophobia and led to the rough treatment of Crimean Tatars in the initial wave of arrival (Williams 2001, 391), with some being stoned by the Uzbek people (Pohl 2000). However, the Uzbeks would eventually realize they shared Islam with the Crimean Tatars (Pohl 2000), leading to better treatment and which, in turn, caused Crimean Tatars to embrace Islam more deeply (Williams 2001, 393).

Islam affects how Crimean Tatars perceive themselves in Crimea. Marlen Kataky, a modern Crimean Tatar, said, “Crimean Tatars are Muslim, and that is inbuilt in our mentality; our customs are built around our religion (Adler 2022).” During the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars feared that the new Russian regime would suppress the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Crimea in the same manner that Russia had done with others (Wilson 2014). Crimean Tatars participated in pro-Ukrainian events, chanting pro-Ukrainian slogans but also chanting Allahu Akbar in Arabic, framing their resistance to Russian occupation in terms of Islam (Wilson 2014).

Interestingly, there was a schism in Crimea’s Islamic population after the annexation of Crimea. The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Crimea, under Mufti Emirali Ablayev, supported Russia, stating that Russian occupation was not a problem (Golod 2023). In contrast, there was widespread criticism of Russia’s treatment of Crimean Tatar from Crimean Tatar organizations and international institutions (Goncharenko 2016). Ablayev’s support for Russia causes Crimean Tatar delegates in Kyiv to declare him a traitor and invalidate his spiritual (Golod 2023). The delegates elected a new Mufti of Crimean Tatars, and, not surprisingly, both leaders denounced one another, hence the schism (Golod 2023). A divide and conquer outcome.

The Islamic identity of the Crimean Tatar people has led to increased persecution by Russia. Following the Crimean annexation, Russia began to criminalize Islam increasingly. For example, Russia recently sentenced five men to 14 years in prison for belonging to the extremist group Hizb-ut Tahir which advocates for the peaceful restoration of the Islamic Caliphate even though Hizb-ut Tahrir is legal under Ukrainian law (Mirovalev 2022). Before the Russian annexation of Crimea, there would have been no grounds for prosecution. Additionally, Russian stands accused of arbitrarily detaining several adherents of Islam for terrorism without any evidence (Mirovalev 2022). Furthermore, the executive committee of the Crimean Tatars, known as the Mejlis, was disbanded after a Russian court found it guilty of “extremism” (Goncharenko 2016). Overall, the Islamic identity of the Crimean Tatar allowed for an increase in Russian persecution.

The Islamic identity of the Crimean Tatars has also led them to be increasingly loyal to the Ukrainian government. However, as was mentioned above, the Ukrainian government does grant Islamic organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir more freedom to practice their beliefs (Mirovalev 2022). Furthermore, the Ukrainian government has courted the support of the Islamic community in the face of Russian persecution. For example, President Volodymir Zelensky recently became the first Ukrainian President to share in Iftar with Islamic soldiers (Knight and Chen 2023). As part of the ceremony, Zelensky stated, "Ramadan was respected everywhere in Ukraine -- even at the front line, even in combat conditions" (Knight and Chen 2023)." Although Zelensky's actions may be purely symbolic, they starkly contrast the Russian views of Islam and perhaps inflame Russia’s dislike of Crimean Tatars.

Tolerance for Islam and the Crimean Tatar people is increasing in Ukrainian society. In the arts, both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars have expressed that Crimea is a loss and a wound needing to heal through solidarity (Finnen, 2022). In 2016, Crimean Tatar Susana Jamaladinova won Ukraine's edition of Eurovision with an original song detailing the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatar people (Adler 2022). For many Ukrainians, this was the first time they heard about the Crimean Tatar deportations (Adler 2022) and perhaps, some sympathy was garnered for the Crimean Tatars. Jamaladinova and the song won the more significant Eurovision contest (The Associated Press 2016). After winning, Jamaladinova appeared on stage draped in a Ukrainian flag, declaring a need for peace and love for everyone (The Associated Press 2016). The moment's symbolism demonstrates the integration of the Crimean Tatar story and identity into the Ukrainian identity. Another example of supporting or restoring the Crimean culture comes from Ukrainian poet Mariana Savka, who writes, "Although we are different, brother, the line of our destiny is joined, / Like a thread stitching a burning wound (Finnin 2022)."

Conclusion

Restoring Crimean Tatar rights and culture likely must involve Ukraine retaking the Crimean Peninsula. Under the previous Ukrainian government, the Crimean Tatars had a voice. Mejlis were allowed to pursue the rights of Crimean Tatars (Coalson 2014). Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, their pro-Ukrainian stance has cost them further persecution. Crimean Russian authorities are accused of harassment, intimidation, threats, intrusive and unlawful searches of their homes, physical attacks, and enforced disappearances (Human Rights Watch 2020), all of which would likely stop under a Ukrainian government. Thus, allowing Crimean Tatars to thrive again.

A Ukrainian victory alone would not bring full restorative justice to Crimean Tatars as they are facing systemic issues that would take years to rectify. Before the invasion of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar population had disproportionately high unemployment and difficulty in securing the restitution of land (The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2023). Furthermore, Crimean Tatar leadership has advocated changing Ukraine’s constitution to redefine Crimean autonomy to mean autonomy for indigenous Tatars (New Voice of Ukraine 2022). However, this proposal would encounter pushback from Russians and Ukrainians, who were most of the population in 2001 (Lublin 2014). Overall, the Ukrainian government needs to adopt a collaborative approach with the Crimean Tatars to reintegrate Crimea in the event of a Ukrainian victory.

If Russia retains control over the Crimean Peninsula, it is unlikely that Crimean Tatar rights could be restored. Russia has historically viewed them as deviant political dissidents (Potichnyj 1975), a perception which is unlikely to change in light of the Crimean Tatars' current pro-Ukraine position. Since annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia has aggressively pursued Russification. In less than a month, Russia had changed the currency from the Ukrainian hryvnia to the Russian ruble (Mandraud 2014). They have banned Tatar Television, limiting their access to information (Green 2022). The US State Department has cited numerous human rights violations against the Crimean Tatars (Green 2022). About 10% of Tatars have fled to mainland Ukraine since the occupation (Green 2022).

Additionally, the region has been flooded by Russian civilians and the Russian military (Mandraud 2014), and there has been a tremendous population shift away from Crimean Tatars. An expansion of Russian interest within the region has come at the expense of the Crimean Tatars, who have been repeatedly targeted for not conforming (Adler 2022). It is hard to determine when, if ever, they will come back.

Should the Russians continue to occupy Crimea, it is difficult to determine what, if anything, the Crimean Tatars could or should do. Participation in resistance movements is one way of countering Russian imperialist activities within Crimea. In fact, despite being targeted by the Russians for military service against Ukraine, some Crimean Tatars have joined the Ukrainian military to fight and hopefully free their homeland (Hunder 2022). However, engaging in resistance movements has given Russia an excuse to persecute Crimean Tatars (Human Rights Watch 2020). A small portion of Crimean Tatars has already shown a readiness to work with Russia and believes this to be the road to transition and acceptance (Golod 2023). The choice of compromise and resistance harkens back to the political differences between the OKND and NDKT. The Russian invasion of Ukraine currently gives Crimea a critical ally, Ukraine, in fighting the Russians, making separatism from Russia more likely. However, those conditions could change. There is no easy solution for Crimean Tatars if Crimea remains Russian.

During the current Russian occupation, Russia has stolen or corrupted many Crimean Tartar cultural objects (Palamarchuk 2022). For example, Khan’s Palace, a symbol of Crimean Tatar statehood, has been systematically destroyed by Russian renovations actions “in violation of international humanitarian law in terms of the inadmissibility of changing an object of cultural heritage, which can lead to the loss of its artistic, historical, and scientific value” (Palamarchuk 2022). Since 2017, the Crimean Institute for Strategic Studies has documented these crimes and cataloged 28 thefts of cultural items, 114 illegal archaeological excavations, and 10 cases of work leading to loss of authenticity of culturally essential objects (Palamarchuk 2022). To retain Crimean Tartar culture, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy began monitoring and recording the destruction of cultural heritage objects. UNESCO has already started work in Crimea (Palamarchuk 2022). Policy needs to be developed to protect Crimean Tatar cultural objects, and money for inventories of items, repositories, and rebuilding of museums and their collections should be allocated (Palamarchuk 2022).

The Crimean Tatars have a long history of conflict with the Russians for centuries. Russia has always distrusted them, and present policy towards Crimean Tatars must be reviewed within this historical framework. Particularly recently, history has been complicated by the triangular interactions and limited cooperation between Russia, Ukraine, and Crimean Tatars. The future of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea is challenging to determine, but for centuries, they have shown courage and determination to survive. They have always organized themselves intending to resurrect their national autonomy and restore their place in Crimea.

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