Global cocaine flows have shifted dramatically in recent years. Once dominated by Latin American cartels serving U.S. markets, cocaine has become hugely lucrative in Europe. Unprecedented European seizures have met record coca cultivation and production in the Andean region. In fact, by 2021, Europe’s cocaine seizures (315 t) began to exceed U.S. seizures (250 t) as demand in EU markets surged. These figures are estimated by reputable European agencies, which have a deep understanding of the illicit European cocaine market, currently valued at €11.6 billion. This appetite is partly fed by higher street prices (about $40,000 per kg in Europe vs. $28,000 in the U.S., roughly +40%). We examine how Mexican and Latin cartels, African transit groups, and European crime syndicates intertwine in these routes, with a focus on developments since 2020.

China’s economy is navigating a complex landscape in 2025. While official data indicates a modest early-year rebound – Q1 GDP grew approximately 5.4% year-on-year, retail sales and industrial output surging in March- significant imbalances overshadow these gains. Beijing is grappling with a prolonged property downturn, high youth unemployment, and deflationary pressures, as evidenced by a 0.1% CPI drop in March (a 0.7% decrease from February) due to factories struggling with excess supply. A Reuters poll forecasts a growth slowdown to around 4.5% in 2025, below the official “around 5%” target. Analysts highlight that China faces “two significant drags simultaneously”: its internal property crisis and an “unprecedented” U.S.-China trade war. While exports have been a bright spot, even these were inflated by front-loaded shipments ahead of tariffs. In summary, current indicators suggest a moderate slowdown, not a collapse, but also a signal that the trade war (and domestic challenges) could undermine Beijing’s objectives.

Five years after the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, what initially seemed like a groundbreaking moment in Middle Eastern diplomacy now appears much more complex and intriguing. The Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, promised a new regional order based on economic cooperation, shared security interests, and diplomacy. Yet, the Israel-Hamas war of October 2023 and the ensuing violence in Gaza have tested the Accords to their limits. The failure of both Israel’s leadership under Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas to provide real solutions to the Palestinian issue has exposed the fragility of these agreements and cast doubt on the long-term success of the Accords.

Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections occur against a backdrop of deep social unrest and a fragmented political landscape, with the potential for violence and political instability remaining high. A sectarian divide has shaped the country’s modern history; roughly two‐thirds of Iraqis are Shia Muslims, and about one‐third are Sunni, along with a significant Kurdish minority in the north. Decades of conflict, from Baathist rule and the Iraq War to the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the rise of ISIS, have entrenched sectarian divisions. In the mid‐2000s, Iraq fought a brutal sectarian civil war, and more recently, the 2013–2017 campaign against ISIS again tore at communal fault lines. The post‐2003 governments were dominated by Shia parties, which inherited the state apparatus and sidelined many Sunni Arabs. This imbalance, combined with chronic corruption, unemployment, and poor public services, has fueled periodic protests, most notably the 2019 “Tishreen” uprising of predominantly young Shiite Iraqis demanding reforms. In short, Iraq’s political system remains brittle: analysts note that “violence and tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds continue to threaten Iraq’s stability and fragile democracy.”

Argentina’s economy has been marred by repeated crises, with the International Monetary Fund often at the center. In the early 2000s, the country was on an unsustainable path: under the IMF‑backed Convertibility Plan, the peso was fixed to the dollar, and debt piled up throughout the 1990s. The scheme collapsed by December 2001, when a partial bank deposit freeze, a default on debt, and the end of the peg plunged output into freefall and produced mass unemployment and political turmoil​. One observer notes that by late 2002, “society angrily ‘kicked out’” the president and cut ties with the IMF and neoliberal rule​. In the aftermath, the left‑of‑center Kirchner administration repudiated much of the prior policy. By 2005, it had fully repaid Argentina’s outstanding IMF debt, effectively driving the Fund out of Buenos Aires for a time.

As the doors of the Sistine Chapel prepare to close for the next conclave, the Roman Catholic Church stands at a moment of profound reflection. The conclave, a gathering of cardinals to elect a new pope, is a significant event in the Church's history. Pope Francis's death has brought mourning and renewed consideration of what kind of leader the Church needs. The next pope will inherit a Church of immense diversity, global reach, and profound spiritual yearning. He will also face the realities of a world in flux, where the faithful seek guidance amid cultural, political, and moral upheaval.

The story of India’s political transformation in the twenty-first century is inseparable from the rise of Hindutva. Hindutva was once a marginal ideological force and became a central pillar of the country's governance and public life. It not only influences electoral outcomes but also shapes the very essence of national identity. Its ascent signifies more than a political shift; it means reimagining India from a secular, pluralistic republic to a Hindu-first nation that defines its past, present, and future in religious and civilizational terms. In this transformation, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have played the role of both architect and executor, gradually but surely remaking India’s institutional and cultural DNA.

It was supposed to be Pierre Poilievre’s election to lose. Canada’s Conservative Party leader had built a commanding lead in the polls for over a year by relentlessly hammering the Liberal government on affordability, housing, and economic mismanagement. After nearly a decade of Justin Trudeau’s leadership, the public appetite for change was palpable. Poilievre, with his sharp populist rhetoric and anti-establishment messaging, positioned himself as the antidote to years of perceived Liberal excess. Even those skeptical of his style began to see his ascent as inevitable. His path to power was open, barring some unforeseen political earthquake.

For years, China has worked tirelessly to craft an image of itself as a benevolent global partner, a literal and metaphorical builder of bridges. Its massive Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, has been promoted as an unprecedented effort to connect the Global South through infrastructure, trade, and mutual development. Chinese state media and diplomatic envoys now regularly contrast this narrative of international solidarity with depictions of a hostile, self-interested United States, especially as new tariffs and trade tensions take center stage. But while China frames itself as a great friend of the developing world, the material consequences of its outreach tell a much different story, one not of generosity but of quiet coercion, dependency, and the slow erosion of sovereignty.

Shigeru Ishiba’s proposal for an “Asian NATO” has ignited a crucial debate about the future of security in East Asia. His call comes when the region faces rapidly evolving security dynamics, primarily driven by China's increasing assertiveness, North Korea's unpredictable behavior, and broader geopolitical tensions. Ishiba's ambitious idea of forming a regional alliance akin to NATO is firmly grounded in a profound understanding of the shifting strategic landscape. His remarks underscore a critical truth: the current security arrangements, particularly the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke system that has shaped East Asian diplomacy since the Cold War, are increasingly inadequate to tackle the complexities of modern threats. As the global order becomes more multipolar, the traditional framework that relied on the United States as the central security guarantor is no longer flexible or unified enough to handle contemporary challenges. In this context, an East Asian security alliance could effectively address these concerns and stimulate regional cooperation that mirrors the region’s growing influence and evolving strategic interests.

In April 2025, reports surfaced that Russia had requested permission to station long-range strategic aircraft at Manuhua Air Force Base on Biak Island in eastern Indonesia. Although Indonesian authorities swiftly denied the claim, the mere suggestion of such an arrangement ignited international alarm and highlighted the complex geopolitical currents reshaping the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of the report’s veracity, it underscored critical questions about Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation, the region’s fragile security architecture, and the broader strategic contest among Russia, China, and the United States.

The deepening rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has shaped regional dynamics in complex and often volatile ways. However, the recent recognition of Somaliland by Ethiopia and the role of the Somali diaspora within Ethiopia has introduced a new and potentially transformative layer to the dispute. What began as a power struggle over control of the Nile has now extended into the Horn of Africa in ways that challenge established norms, stir nationalist sentiments, and push Somalia into a more active and precarious role within the conflict. As Ethiopia’s political calculations evolve and Cairo seeks to outmaneuver Addis Ababa on multiple fronts, the Somalia-Somaliland question is no longer peripheral. It is increasingly central to the broader competition for influence and legitimacy across Northeast Africa.