After World War II, Japan adopted a strict policy of pacifism. Its postwar Constitution (enacted 1947) famously renounces war and forbids the maintenance of military forces, declaring that the Japanese people “forever renounce war as a sovereign right.” In practice, this “pacifist” clause was interpreted to allow only a strictly self-defensive posture – Japan created the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) under a doctrine of “minimum necessary” For decades, Tokyo followed a so-called Yoshida Doctrine, relying entirely on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty for defense. It maintained a minimal force, channeling resources into economic revival instead of military might. The Constitution and Treaty were the twin pillars of Japan’s early strategy, ensuring peace under American nuclear protection even as Japan rebuilt into a global economic power.
In recent years, Japan’s security environment has deteriorated dramatically. Officials repeatedly warn that China is pursuing “an unprecedented military buildup,” fielding vast new arsenals of advanced weapons, from warplanes to missiles to cyber and space systems. At the same time, North Korea is racing ahead with its own nuclear and missile programs, openly flouting U.N. sanctions to build “a credible nuclear warfighting capability” that experts say could evade regional missile defenses. In short, the sea around Japan is now crowded with modern armed forces, raising the risk of confrontation. Contested islands, gray-zone incursions, and even threats against Japan’s allies have eroded Tokyo’s postwar confidence. However, Japan’s leaders have not been passive in the face of these challenges but have instead proactively rethought the old restraints, demonstrating their commitment to ensuring the country's security.
Acknowledging these threats, Prime Minister Kishida’s government has begun to expand Japan’s military commitments while preserving the U.S. alliance at its core. Tokyo has pledged to boost its defense budget and capabilities, announcing plans to roughly double military spending over the next five years, and has revised its National Security Strategy accordingly. At the same time; Japan continues to bear a significant share of the cost for U.S. forces stationed on its soil. As one Reuters report noted, Japan now pays on the order of ¥211 billion per year toward U.S. basing costs. (That hefty figure has drawn pressure from Washington for even larger “burden-sharing” contributions.) In short, Japan is spending more on deterrence while shouldering a significant portion of the financial burden of its alliance with the United States.
Japan is also deepening its defense partnerships, a move that significantly strengthens its international alliances. In late 2022, Japan made a highly symbolic leap by signing on to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Britain and Italy. The three countries agreed to co-develop a next-generation, sixth-generation fighter jet, and field the first aircraft by approximately 2035. This marks the first time Japan will jointly produce combat aircraft with partners other than the United States, a significant step beyond the earlier US-assisted F-2 program. The new stealthy fighter will be designed for the intense future battlespace, leveraging European-Japanese industrial cooperation. By spearheading GCAP, Japan signals its intention to match the advanced airborne capabilities of potential adversaries at a lower cost rather than simply buying off-the-shelf U.S. jets, thereby strengthening its defense capabilities and international alliances.
Likewise, Japan has taken unprecedented steps toward security coordination with South Korea. Long-standing historical tensions kept Tokyo and Seoul apart, but shared threats have spurred a reset. In August 2023, President Biden invited Japan’s and Korea’s leaders to Camp David, the first summit of its kind. There, Tokyo and Seoul agreed with Washington on a series of new commitments: they would “consult promptly” with each other in crises, coordinate responses to threats, and hold annual trilateral military exercises. In that statement, they pledged to share real-time data on North Korean missile launches and to meet at least once a year, as reported by Reuters. This move fell short of a formal “alliance,” but it marked a breakthrough in diplomatic terms. The momentum continued in mid-2024: at a July meeting in Tokyo, the defense ministers of Japan, the United States, and South Korea signed a Memorandum on a “Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework.” By this agreement, the three parties reaffirmed their intention to maintain ongoing three-way coordination – including senior policy consultations, joint exercises, and real-time missile warning data sharing – thereby institutionalizing their security ties.
Japan has also expanded reciprocity agreements with other Asian partners. In November 2023, Tokyo and Manila announced they would negotiate Japan’s first Reciprocal Access Agreement in Southeast Asia. Once concluded, the pact will allow Japanese and Philippine forces to train on each other’s territory in a broad range of scenarios, much like the Philippines’ existing U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement. Japanese officials noted that Tokyo already has reciprocal access pacts with Britain and Australia, and the new deal with Manila is intended to strengthen regional security in the contested South China Sea. (President Marcos of the Philippines has already praised the move as a key step toward peace and stability.) In effect, Japan is weaving a network of bilateral and trilateral security ties, each one tailored to geography, to complement the U.S. alliance umbrella.
Another critical trend is Japan’s use of foreign aid to bolster partners’ defenses, a strategic move that significantly enhances Japan's global security strategy. In 2023, Tokyo launched the “Official Security Assistance” (OSA) program, a new foreign aid framework modeled on economic Official Development Assistance (ODA) but explicitly designed for military and security purposes. Under OSA, Japan gives grants of equipment and infrastructure support to friendly countries at no cost to them. For fiscal 2024, Japan earmarked roughly ¥5 billion (about $33 million) for OSA – more than double the previous year’s level. That budget will be used to ship coastal radars, surveillance gear and other defense hardware to four allied states (initially the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia and Djibouti). All four share strategic interests with Japan: the Philippines and Indonesia are maritime democracies wary of China, Mongolia sits in China’s northern “backyard,” and Djibouti hosts Japan’s only overseas Self-Defense Forces base. By distributing free defense kits to these partners, Tokyo aims to enhance its deterrent power and its strategic influence without deploying its troops abroad, thereby demonstrating the depth and strategic nature of Japan's global security strategy.
Even beyond East Asia, Japan is reviving “minilateral” security forums. A case in point is the long-running “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue, a grouping that brings together Tokyo with the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Established in 2004, this forum channels Japanese loans and projects into a traditionally neglected region. Japan has financed everything from roads to energy projects there, often explicitly tying assistance to stability aims. For example, in 2024, Tokyo agreed to lend Uzbekistan ¥39 billion (around $268 million) to help stabilize its economy during the political transition. These initiatives reflect a Tokyo strategy to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence between the Caspian and the Himalayas by deepening ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Japan has long viewed a secure Central Asia as part of its broader vision for a stable “Indo-Pacific” zone.
By comparison, other regional powers are also rearming rapidly. China already fields the largest navy in the world and is on track to surpass the U.S. in several areas; its leaders openly state that they aim for regional dominance. South Korea, facing the same North Korean threat, has likewise embarked on an ambitious defense upgrade. One industry study reports that Seoul will spend approximately $222 billion on its military from 2021 to 2025 to counter both Pyongyang and China. The United States, for its part, has made the “free and open Indo-Pacific” its stated priority. U.S. strategy documents emphasize the importance of reinforcing alliances and maintaining open sea lanes by international law. As a White House briefing put it, Washington and its partners have built “a shared foundation for the Indo-Pacific, one that is free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.” In other words, Japan now operates in a highly charged great-power contest, so it must thread the needle between deterrence and diplomacy.
Taken together, these moves suggest Japan’s “grand strategy” is evolving into a more assertive, networked approach. Tokyo has not abandoned its alliance with Washington, but it is leveraging that alliance into a wider coalitional posture. It is striking a balance between hard deterrence (boosting missiles and new fighter jets) and alliance management (increased cost-sharing, joint commands). It is also stepping into a quasi-leadership role through aid and diplomacy. By funding partners’ defenses and convening dialogues from Southeast Asia to Central Asia, Japan is effectively exporting security. Japan’s recent Foreign Policy Bluebook explicitly calls for “expanding multilayered networks among allies and like-minded countries,” including joint arrangements with Australia, India, Europe, and beyond. In practice, this means Tokyo is pursuing a grand strategy of proactive pacifism: remaining formally pacifist at home while taking on more responsibility for regional peace. In this delicate balancing act, Japan aims to deter Chinese adventurism and North Korean provocations without destabilizing its diplomatic standing. The result is an emerging strategy that combines deterrence, alliance solidarity, and proactive leadership aimed at preserving Japan’s security and the broader regional order.
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