Libyans are no strangers to protest. In Tripoli, thousands gathered at Martyrs’ Square to mark the anniversary of the 2011 uprising that toppled longtime ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. That revolt ended four decades of dictatorship, but it also unleashed conflicts that have splintered the state. In theory, Libya had all the ingredients for a stable nation: a small population and vast oil wealth. However, after Gaddafi’s fall, power instead diffused into dozens of armed groups. Analysts warned early on that ‘oil-rich Libya’ could easily implode, and within months, rival militias were controlling cities and oil terminals. In fact, over 20,000 heavy weapons were looted from the regime’s stockpiles, arming new warlords across the country. The interim National Transitional Council, in 2011, declared Libya “liberated” and planned for elections. Still, those hopes quickly faded. Over the last decade, the central authority has largely collapsed, and Libya has been carved into zones of influence controlled by rival armed coalitions.
Hope for unity quickly faded after Qaddafi’s overthrow. Libya’s 2012 elections produced a new assembly. Still, the result was disputed, and armed groups from the revolution fought each other for control. By 2014, national unity was a pipe dream: following elections that year, the eastern-based House of Representatives refused to sit in Tripoli and instead set up in Tobruk, while rival Islamists loyal to the old assembly held court in the capital. Each faction claimed legitimacy, spinning up parallel ministries and even separate oil companies. Libyans witnessed the emergence of two governments: the Tripoli side, backed by a web of Western militias and some foreign aid, and an eastern regime allied with Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). Ordinary citizens suffered as the two sides fought over resources and jobs. In July 2022, exasperated Libyans again took to Tripoli’s Martyrs’ Square to protest power cuts and stagnation, venting their anger at feuding leaders who had failed to improve daily life.
International mediators have repeatedly tried to break this deadlock. A UN-brokered conference in late 2020 produced a roadmap and installed a Government of National Unity (GNU) under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. The plan called for nationwide elections in December 2021, but deep disagreements over-rules and rival candidacies led to the vote’s postponement. Earlier, in 2016, the UN had tried to reconcile the sides with a Libyan Political Agreement, forming the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord under Fayez al-Sarraj, yet even that unity never entirely took hold. When the 2021 vote fell through, the eastern parliament (in Tobruk) appointed its prime minister, effectively cementing two governments in parallel. Thus, today, one camp centers on Tripoli, while Haftar’s LNA in the east backs the other, and neither has exclusive control of all national institutions. Libya briefly held municipal elections in late 2024 with an unexpectedly high turnoutunsmil.unmissions.org, but those local polls did nothing to break the deeper east-west standoff.
Foreign powers have played a disproportionate role in Libya’s conflict. By mid-2020, the country was effectively split between the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli and a rival authority in the east aligned with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The UAE, Egypt, and Russia bankrolled Haftar’s LNA. At the same time, Turkey reciprocated by sending military support and Syrian mercenaries to Tripoli. When Haftar’s forces launched a months-long assault on Tripoli in 2019–2020, Turkish intervention turned the tide: Turkish drones helped push the LNA back east. Since that setback, each side has hardened front lines, effectively turning Libya into a proxy war. Observers note Libya’s conflict “has become a proxy war, fueled by rival foreign powers such as Russia and Turkey.” UN monitors report that the country has also become a playground for foreign mercenaries, including private companies from Russia and Turkey, operating in support of the rival factions. In practice this means Libya’s fracture has been locked in place by outside patronage as much as by local divisions.
Armed militias loom over Libya’s economy and security. These fighters, born of the uprising or long-standing tribal networks, now often act as local warlords enforcing their own rule. They even control the oil lifeblood of the state. For example, Haftar’s LNA imposed a nationwide oil shutdown in early 2020, which Libya’s own National Oil Company estimated would cost the economy roughly $4 billion. Militias around the country have blocked or seized export terminals in turn, the Petroleum Facilities Guard militia famously shut down Libya’s main oil terminals in 2013. Some brigades sell fuel on the black market. State fuel and revenues are routinely siphoned off: analysts estimate militias diverted over a million tonnes of diesel after 2022 to profit from the crisis. No single national oil company or ministry can reliably function: Libya now often has two competing central banks, two governments and two hierarchies of oil officials, each funded by its patron faction. Extremist fighters have also exploited the chaos: ISIS seized Sirte and other towns in 2015 before being expelled by 2016, but smaller jihadist cells and Al-Qaeda affiliates still lurk in Libya’s desert fringes. In practice, Libya’s official structures, from the national oil company to the central bank, have been hollowed out, leaving each region a de facto fiefdom of its most powerful militia.
The ripple effects of Libya’s breakdown extend across North Africa. Its vast southern frontier has become a highway for fighters and weapons into the Sahel. UN monitors report that Libyan smugglers, and even official militias, profit from trafficking arms, migrants, and other contraband across the Sahara. Libya’s south now even harbors foreign combatants: UN experts say Sudan’s rival armies have taken refuge in eastern Libya. Across the region, the fear is that a fractured Libya becomes a haven for terrorism. Indeed, as early as 2013, a UN panel warned that Libyan arms were flowing out “at an alarming rate,” “fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant,” from Mali to Syria. In practice, this means more weapons in the hands of jihadis across the Maghreb and West Africa, and more refugees and fighters radiating outward from Libya’s ungoverned spaces.
As one analysis observes, “the country remains divided between rival administrations, with the LNA controlling the east and parts of the south, and the GNU governing the [west].” For the United States, Libya’s chaos, therefore, looms large for both strategy and security. Libya holds Africa’s largest oil reserves, but Washington’s immediate concern is the threat posed by militants rather than the resources themselves. U.S. Africa Command has intensified its engagement in Libya, focusing on regional counterterrorism efforts. As one analyst notes, AFRICOM’s role in Libya is part of a strategy “to enhance regional stability and combat terrorism in North Africa,” helping to build local capacity to prevent the spread of extremism. In practice, U.S. warplanes and special forces have struck jihadist targets in Libya and trained local partners. American policymakers worry that a failing Libya risks a new wave of terrorism or migration flows toward Europe. Even so, the United States has few good options. It maintains a modest military presence in the region and collaborates with NATO allies while also encouraging Libyans to resolve their differences peacefully. In short, U.S. decision-makers believe that even a fragile stabilization of Libya can help shore up its counterterrorism goals and prevent rival powers from filling the void.
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