Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections occur against a backdrop of deep social unrest and a fragmented political landscape, with the potential for violence and political instability remaining high. A sectarian divide has shaped the country’s modern history; roughly two‐thirds of Iraqis are Shia Muslims, and about one‐third are Sunni, along with a significant Kurdish minority in the north. Decades of conflict, from Baathist rule and the Iraq War to the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the rise of ISIS, have entrenched sectarian divisions. In the mid‐2000s, Iraq fought a brutal sectarian civil war, and more recently, the 2013–2017 campaign against ISIS again tore at communal fault lines. The post‐2003 governments were dominated by Shia parties, which inherited the state apparatus and sidelined many Sunni Arabs. This imbalance, combined with chronic corruption, unemployment, and poor public services, has fueled periodic protests, most notably the 2019 “Tishreen” uprising of predominantly young Shiite Iraqis demanding reforms. In short, Iraq’s political system remains brittle: analysts note that “violence and tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds continue to threaten Iraq’s stability and fragile democracy.”
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni‐dominated regime, Shia Islamist parties, many with close ties to Iran, have wielded power. The Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) is a loose coalition of Iran‑aligned Shia parties formed after the 2021 elections. It includes the Badr Organization (led by Hadi al‑Amiri), former Prime Minister Nouri al‑Maliki’s Dawa Party, the pro‑Iran militia Asaib Ahl al‑Haqq (led by Qais al‑Khazali), and the “Wisdom Movement” of Ammar al‑Hakim (a cleric connected by family to an older Iran‑backed party). These factions share many goals, especially ending U.S. military presence and preserving their influence, but compete fiercely for positions and resources. For example, Reuters notes that CF members have “competed for power and resources and often do not see eye-to-eye” despite a united front against rival Shia leader Moqtada al‑Sadr. The Coordination Framework officially announced that its member parties would run on separate electoral lists in 2025 but re-form the alliance after the vote. This maneuver reflects intra-Shia rivalries and a strategy to maximize seats under Iraq’s open-list voting system.
Muqtada al‑Sadr’s bloc represents a different Shia strand. Sadr, a populist cleric from impoverished neighborhoods, commands a significant grassroots following. He has railed against corruption, U.S. presence, and Iranian influence. He led the State of Law Coalition and then formed his party, winning the most votes in the 2018 and 2021 elections. However, Sadr’s support of mass protests and insistence on cutting militias out of power put him at odds with the Iran‑aligned Coordination Framework. After repeatedly boycotting parliament and briefly forcing elections, Sadr ultimately withdrew his followers from the government in 2022 amid disputes over “service laws” for the pro‑Iran militias. His movement officially announced it would not participate in the November 2025 polls. However, Iraqi media reported that leaders in various Sunni, Kurdish, and Shia factions tried to persuade him otherwise. Sadr’s stance remains wild; he has periodically surprised analysts by entering or exiting politics, and many expect him to re-engage after the vote.
The rise of Iran‑backed militias looms large over the election. During the fight against ISIS (2014–2017), Baghdad mobilized Shiite volunteer militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or Hashd al‑Shaabi). The PMF was legalized as an official security service, and many of its units have close ties to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Groups like Badr (al‑Amiri’s militia), Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al‑Nujaba, Asaib al‑Haqq, and others now straddle the line between political party and armed faction. For example, Kataib Hezbollah, one of the closest allies of Tehran, fielded a political party in the 2021 elections and won several seats. Likewise, Harakat al‑Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al‑Shuhada have limited parliamentary representation and powerful militias. Collectively, these Iran‑aligned militias form the core of an informal “Islamic Resistance” bloc that has claimed over 150 rocket and drone attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria since late 2023.
As institutions, the militias wield enormous resources. A recent analysis noted that Iraq’s state‐sanctioned PMF budget (around $3.4 billion in 2024) exceeds Lebanon’s or Yemen’s national budgets. Yet, it has virtually no auditing or transparency. About 238,000 PMF personnel are on the books, but the government lacks reliable personnel records. In practice, these groups use government paychecks to fund their networks, establishing extensive patronage systems that boost their political parties at the polls. This heavy fiscal stake gives Iran‑backed militias political influence: multiple senior figures and cabinet posts were already held by militia-linked politicians in the previous parliament. In sum, the militias form a quasi-state within the state, a “parallel armed force” analogous to an embedded IRGC in the heart of Iraq’s security sector.
However, the militias’ position is being tested by external pressures. Both the United States and regional states have been urging Baghdad to clamp down on the most extreme militia operations. In early 2025, the U.S. privately warned that continued attacks by Iranian proxies would trigger airstrikes. Reuters reported that Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia al‑Sudani, has held talks with militia leaders, who indicated they would “comply” and stand down to avoid a U.S. confrontation. The militias told Reuters they were “aware” they could be targeted and wanted to “avoid such a bad scenario.” Despite this PR of disarmament, analysts caution that Iran‑backed groups are unlikely to relinquish their goal of expelling U.S. forces without serious political setbacks in Iraq. Indeed, their leaders have recently moderated public rhetoric and paused attacks to safeguard their resources as a strategy of “survival” amid U.S. and Israeli pressure. Many militias see their best option as laying low until a more favorable regime takes charge rather than openly disbanding.
As the election approaches, militias are a central issue. Some voters demand the militias be brought under state control or dissolved. U.S. and Iraqi officials want to pass legislation (like the “PMF Authority Law”) that would formalize and regulate these forces, an effort bitterly opposed by the Iran‑aligned Shia parties. Indeed, this legislative battle has torn at the Coordination Framework: one recent proposal attempted to push the PMF chief Falih al‑Fayyad (an Iran‑backed cleric) into retirement, paving the way for rival factions to take over. If Fayyad stays in power, the pro-Iran bloc remains united; if he is ousted, militias like Asaib al‑Haqq may gamble on reshuffling the PMF leadership to their advantage. In any event, the outcome of the elections will determine whether the PMF retains its privileged status. A government led by anti-militia groups (for example, if Sadr or other nationalist parties make gains) could try to cut their funding and integrate them fully into the Iraqi army. Conversely, if pro‑Iran parties hold or expand their majority, the militias will likely keep their sway and budget.
The campaign season also risks sparking violence. A turbulent government battle and many attacks followed Iraq’s last parliamentary race (October 2021). In January 2022, a wave of bombings and shootings struck Baghdad, including attacks on Kurdish-owned banks and offices of Sunni politicians, just days after the new parliament convened. Though no group claimed those strikes, analysts linked them to militia elements unsettled by political rivals gaining power. Ahead of the upcoming vote, security forces remain on high alert. Prime Minister Sudani has met with the electoral commission to firm up logistics, but opposition figures warn that demobilizing armed factions is critical to avoid intimidation. There is particular concern over the influence of extremist elements: the Islamic State remains active in remote areas and could try to exploit pre- or post-election unrest. Meanwhile, the U.S. still keeps thousands of troops in Iraq; any new IRGC‑US flashpoint (for example, over Iran’s nuclear program) could spill into Iraq and affect election security.
The Sunni Arab community, long critical of Shia dominance, is watching closely. Many Sunnis boycott politics or form small alliances. In the last election, Sunni lists (for example, the Taqaddum coalition) won a modest number of seats, but they were often the swing vote in forming a government. Sunni politicians have sometimes cooperated with Sadr’s bloc in parliament, but they also chafe at being excluded from power. Some Sunnis have protested corruption and demanded more jobs and services in their provinces. Sunni militias are a much smaller factor today than the Shia. However, some tribal militias and erstwhile insurgent groups still hold guns (the “Hashd al‑Shaabi” historically included some Sunni units). The Sunni grievances over jobs and justice remain unresolved, and rival factions' perceived manipulation of the vote could reignite anger. However, there is also evidence of pragmatic crossover. For instance, in early 2022, the Sunni Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Halbousi, was re-elected thanks to the backing of Sadrists and the Kurdish KDP, showing that sectarian lines can blur for shared political interests.
Iraq’s Kurdish minority, about 15–20% of the population, constitutes a third block of voters. The two largest Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), dominate Iraq’s semi-autonomous north. Historically, they have guaranteed themselves dozens of seats in Baghdad by running on unified lists. They generally seek a federal power-sharing arrangement in return for supporting a Baghdad government. The Kurds have long pushed for a larger share of oil revenues and control over disputed territories (like Kirkuk). In recent years, KRG leaders have complained that Shia-led federal courts and budgets have eroded Kurdish autonomy. The Kurdish parties are often kingmakers: for example, the KDP joined with Sadr’s Shiite bloc in 2022 to elect the parliament speaker. In the upcoming election, Kurds will decide national representation and controlling forces in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (though those regional votes are separate). Any gains by Kurdish candidates in Baghdad could tilt coalition math. Conversely, a weaker showing might force the Kurds into opposition or trigger renewed demands for autonomy. The growing rift between KDP and PUK (which held its leadership contest in late 2024) adds uncertainty to the Kurdish strategy.
All of these dynamics, sectarian divisions, militia power, Sunni disenchantment, and Kurdish ambitions, mean that the 2025 vote could reshape Iraq’s trajectory. Observers note that the elections occur “as Iraq’s political landscape continues to shift, particularly with the expected decrease in the influence of Iran-backed militia groups.” ( Indeed, U.S. diplomatic pressure and a changing regional order (for example, improved Gulf ties) have put Iraqi elites on notice. If Iraqis vote strongly for candidates promising reform, it could marginalize the Iran-linked bloc. However, as one analyst warned, the militias have “share[d] resources and establish[ed] extensive patronage networks” that heavily influence elections. The stakes are high: the elected parliament will name a new government and prime minister, who must then wrestle with disarming militias, allocating the oil revenues to all provinces and addressing grievances on all sides. Success will require peaceful transfers of power and a broad coalition, a tall order in today’s Iraq. What is clear is that the 2025 election will not only decide who governs Iraq but also how far the country moves toward or away from the sectarian and foreign-dominated status quo.
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