China and Sudan: How Oil and Arms Fueled a Relationship That Turns a Blind Eye to Atrocities

China and Sudan have been close partners for decades, bound by oil pipelines, arms deals, and a mutual policy of non-interference. Sudan was among the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1959, setting the tone for a friendship based on the principles of non-interference, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and mutual benefits. Over the 1960s and 70s, China began sending technical aid and interest-free loans to Sudan for roads, bridges and hospitals, cementing relations without attaching political conditions. By the 1990s the relationship had become transactional: Western firms fled Sudan’s rising insurgency and U.S. sanctions, while China’s state oil companies flooded in. China’s CNPC invested billions in Sudanese oil fields and built a pipeline to Port Sudan, effectively filling the vacuum left by departing Western investors. In 1995, President Omar al-Bashir sought China’s help with oil after U.S. firms left; by 2005, CNPC controlled most of Sudan’s oil production. Beijing justified this stance by citing its principle of sovereignty, it opposed U.S.-led sanctions on Khartoum in 2004 on those grounds. In practice, China became a key player in the development of Sudan’s oil sector, and provided massive loans and infrastructure support to Khartoum.

At the same time, Chinese support for Bashir’s government extended beyond economic considerations. Chinese engineers and workers built roads and airstrips deep in Sudan’s south, ostensibly for oil pipelines. Still, these were dual-use highways that Sudan’s army used to move troops and weapons during the civil wars. Human rights observers accused China of “deep complicity in gross human rights violations” by helping clear oil areas of civilians and by supplying Khartoum’s military with arms and equipment. For example, researchers found that China supplied Sudan with tanks, fighter planes, helicopters, rifles and ammunition; at least three weapons factories were set up inside Sudan by the mid-2000s. Much of this trade was tied to oil: NGOs noted that China’s arms exports often involved raw materials in exchange. It continued arming Sudan even as atrocities mounted in Darfur.  In 2006, Amnesty reported that China was still delivering military trucks and transport vehicles into Sudan despite warnings that they were being used against civilians in Darfur.

As Darfur erupted into genocide in the early 2000s, China’s stance drew sharp criticism abroad. U.S. lawmakers and activist groups, such as Save Darfur, largely blamed Beijing for shielding Khartoum. In 2007, some activists even called for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics to pressure China to stop arming Sudan and to withdraw investments. The Save Darfur Coalition noted that China had “close ties” to Sudan’s oil industry and had long resisted United Nations actions on the crisis. China’s diplomats famously insisted that “Darfur is not China’s Darfur. Firstly, it is Sudan’s Darfur, and second it is Africa’s Darfur,” underscoring Beijing’s refusal to allow foreign intervention. In practice, China and its UN ally Russia repeatedly blocked or watered down resolutions to protect Darfur civilians, citing Sudan’s sovereign prerogatives. As one analyst observed, Beijing showed a “willingness to use its Security Council veto” to prevent any non-consensual deployment of peacekeepers into Darfur. This unconditional support for Khartoum at the UN Security Council sent a clear message to Sudan’s rulers. Critics say it gave Bashir’s regime confidence to continue its genocidal ambitions with minimal fear of international reprisal. In effect, China’s backing acted as a shield for atrocities. An expert noted that without China “clearly signaled that it will block any authorizing resolution… Khartoum’s genocidaires effectively wield a veto themselves in the Security Council.”

Under heavy international pressure, China did eventually soften its approach. In 2007, President Hu Jintao visited Khartoum and promised Khartoum support, a $70 million debt write-off, and new loans and aid while privately urging Bashir to settle Darfur by dialogue. China even agreed, reluctantly, to back a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur and to allow the humanitarian assistance. But Beijing insisted on a delicate balance: it emphasized Sudan’s sovereignty and Bashir’s central role in any solution, even as it donated tents, medical supplies and a few hundred peacekeepers to the joint UN-African mission. The pivot was pragmatic, China still needed stability to keep oil flowing and to ensure success for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but it never amounted to a public reckoning with Khartoum’s crimes. By 2011, after South Sudan’s independence, China reassured the post-separation Sudanese government that it would continue to support the country’s development efforts in the oil, agricultural, and mining sectors, regardless of the regime in Khartoum.

Over the next decade, China consolidated its ties. It invested in Sudan’s minerals and built infrastructure under its Belt and Road program; by 2018, it had become Sudan’s second-largest trading partner and a major financier of dams, railways, and port facilities. In late 2019, when a coup ousted Bashir, China quietly switched its support to the new generals, hoping to preserve order and protect its Belt and Road investments. China supported the new leadership to ensure stability” because Sudan’s strategic Red Sea location was prospective for the Belt and Road initiative even though the old strongman was gone. China made no demands about democracy or human rights, only that the country remain safe for its oil and projects.

Against this historical backdrop, China’s role in the current Sudanese civil war is a continuation of that transactional approach. When war broke out in April 2023 between Sudan’s regular army (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Beijing publicly called for peace and pledged humanitarian aid. China’s UN ambassador, Fu Cong, noted the massive civilian suffering and said China was delivering food, medicine, and relief supplies to Sudan. He urged both sides to halt the violence, even invoking a ceasefire during Ramadan and praising Sudan’s national plan to protect civilians. These statements align with China’s usual rhetoric, humanitarian assistance and respect for Sudanese sovereignty. Still, they have deliberately avoided criticizing any human rights violations by either the SAF or the RSF.

Meanwhile, arms and military ties have quietly deepened. In 2024, Sudan’s state arms company signed a new defense cooperation pact with China’s Poly Technologies at a China-Africa forum. Poly is known to sell many of the same weapons that have been used in the Sudanese war. Human rights investigators have documented that Beijing-made arms are now in the hands of both sides. Amnesty International found recently manufactured Chinese weapons, including advanced drone jammers, mortars, and anti-materiel rifles, being used by both the army and the RSF across Sudan. Video evidence shows RSF units deploying Chinese-made assault rifles and heavy guns, and analysts have identified Chinese mortars used in Darfur fights.

Even more striking are reports that sophisticated Chinese bombs are being used on the battlefield. In 2025, Amnesty documented fragments of Norinco GB50A guided aerial bombs and AH-4 howitzers at RSF attack sites in Khartoum and Darfur. These weapons, never before seen in any conflict, are manufactured by China North Industries (Norinco) and were almost certainly supplied to Sudan via third parties. Investigators traced the bombs to the RSF’s Chinese-made attack drones; evidence shows that the arms were re-exported to Sudan by the United Arab Emirates, a frequent Swiss-army-knife supplier to the RSF.  In other words, Beijing-produced ordnance is flying over Darfur even as China officially upholds an arms embargo there. As Amnesty put it, “Chinese-made guided bombs and howitzers have been used in Sudan,” and China, as a signatory of the global Arms Trade Treaty, now “must take urgent measures to prevent the diversion of arms to Sudan” via proxies.

Human Rights Watch came to a similar conclusion: recent drone footage and battlefield photos show both warring sides with Chinese-origin equipment. One briefing in 2024 noted that newly arrived drones, rocket launchers, and jammers were “produced by companies registered in China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, and the UAE.” Another HRW report cited findings from Amnesty that weapons from China (alongside Russia and others) have been “imported in large quantities into Sudan” and often diverted straight into Darfur. These independent investigations paint a picture of China-bound weapons flowing into the conflict; even if China itself claims neutrality, its high-technology exports are ending up wherever the money and influence of its partners reach.

Throughout all this, China’s official position remains one of even-handed calls for peace and respect for sovereignty. At the United Nations, China’s representatives have never blamed one side for the bloodshed. When the UN Security Council called for a Sudanese ceasefire in March 2024, China’s deputy ambassador, Dai Bing, startled diplomats by saying the council must also remember the plight of civilians in Gaza, effectively linking the Sudan war to other conflicts. He urged an “immediate cessation of hostilities” in Sudan. Still, only after reminding the world not to ignore Gaza. In practice, China has been keen to show that it cares about humanitarian issues, praising UN relief agencies and sharing aid. Yet, it stops short of holding any party in Sudan accountable. President Biden and U.S. lawmakers have openly labeled RSF atrocities as genocide, but China’s public statements avoid such moral judgments. Instead, Beijing reiterates support for “Sudan’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity” and calls on all factions to stop fighting.

This reflects a familiar theme: China prioritizes its interests over human rights considerations. For years, Western governments pressed Beijing to sanction Khartoum or halt arms sales, to no avail. China has consistently emphasized non-interference and the importance of stability. The same reasoning applies now. Sudan’s chaos poses a threat to China’s investment; if the oil stops flowing or Chinese engineers are in danger, Beijing must take action. Hence, we see China quietly urging ceasefires and even helping evacuate its workers and diplomats. But we also see Beijing abstaining from condemning the regime or vetoing any UN actions aimed at punishing war criminals. Analysts note that Sudan’s generals remain emboldened by knowing that China will not allow any harsh UN resolution; the international community, as in the case of Darfur, is wary of confronting Beijing’s ally.

In effect, China looks the other way when Sudanese forces commit atrocities as long as Beijing’s strategic goals are not threatened. Both warring sides in Sudan have committed horrific war crimes, mass killings, rapes, and ethnic cleansing, even as they wield Chinese-supplied weapons. Human rights groups and international courts have demanded accountability, but China has consistently insisted that this is for Sudan itself to handle. In testimony at the UN, China has emphasized the need for peaceful dialogue and repeatedly urged all sides to disarmmfa.gov.cn. Meanwhile, arms flow continues unimpeded. Critics argue that China’s silence effectively condones the atrocities because, without Chinese restraint, the Sudanese leadership feels free to do as it pleases. One commentator put it bluntly: Beijing’s “uncompromising and unqualified support for the regime at the UN Security Council” has been a key factor in allowing Sudanese leaders “to believe that their ruthless… warfare will not be challenged."

China’s defenders would say it is merely respecting Sudanese sovereignty and playing a constructive role. But the optics are stark. At a time when the world looks on in horror at Darfur’s bloodletting, China remains Sudan’s ally and arms supplier. Its business with Sudanese gold and oil carries on. Meanwhile, Sudan’s people pay the price for a conflict fueled in part by Chinese weapons. In the crowded global theater of today’s geopolitical struggles, Sudan is a stage where China’s priorities, economic ties, and political leverage outweigh any concerns about human rights. The history of China–Sudan relations makes this pattern unmistakable: deep investment and loyal backing to Khartoum, coupled with a studious turning of the other cheek whenever atrocities occur. Whether that will change now, in the face of genocide-level violence and mounting international pressure, remains an open question. Still, so far, China’s role has been one of cautious self-interest, firmly rooted in the decades-long partnership of oil and arms.