A war-scarred Tehran harbors whispers of change at the summit of Iran’s power. The unexpected war with Israel has brought Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s fate into stark relief. The octogenarian ruler has been barely seen since mid-June, shrouded in secrecy, with his whereabouts undisclosed as Tehran quietly made contingency plans. State media have given little clue to his health beyond terse video statements; nevertheless, rumors now swirl that the 86-year-old leader has suffered recent health scares. Last year, Western reports claimed he fell gravely ill and underwent emergency surgery for a bowel obstruction, only to reappear suddenly on television, denying any lasting ailment.
Inside Iran, his aides insist the leader is “in perfect health,” but even loyalists admit his advanced age and weeks of silence have spurred unprecedented speculation. As one Iranian analyst puts it, “everything in Iran in the past four or five years has been about succession.”
Behind the scenes, the regime has begun to treat succession as a real possibility. Reuters reports that two years ago Khamenei convened a special committee of senior clerics to identify his replacement, and that this summer’s crisis abruptly accelerated its work. Insiders say Khamenei and his family have since gone into virtual hiding under the protection of elite Guards, even as the regime quietly directed senior officials to stay underground and refrain from using cellphones for security’s sake. With each new missile strike or loss of a general, Tehran has shuffled officers and named backups; according to The Times of Israel, Khamenei has even identified a short list of three senior clerics as potential successors “if he is killed.” The officials quoted by the press noted one omission from that list was Khamenei’s son: Mojtaba. This is telling, given that the son has long been viewed as the heir apparent. For years, observers have believed Mojtaba, a 55-year-old hardline cleric, was being quietly groomed for succession. The son now holds the rank of ayatollah (a status he only achieved recently), runs the leader’s office, and wields enormous influence over the Revolutionary Guards. But naming one’s son Supreme Leader would risk the appearance of a dynastic monarchy, a prospect Khamenei himself has publicly disavowed. Tehran sources say Khamenei “repeatedly opposed” plans for hereditary rule after the Shah’s overthrow in 1979. Reporters note that one effect of excluding Mojtaba would be to burnish the regime’s legitimacy by keeping the succession institutional rather than familial.
That leaves room for several contenders, and leading the list in foreign accounts are Mojtaba’s surprisingly impersonal rivals. Reuters and NPR both identify two top names: Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini, the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson. Mohammad Hassan Khomeini is a 53-year-old cleric with a reputation as a moderate.
His family pedigree and past reformist leanings make him palatable to many Iranians disillusioned by decades of isolation. According to analysts, hardline decision-makers acknowledge that Hassan’s lineage, and his occasional warnings about popular discontent, could help soothe tensions at home, especially while Iran is under siege. By contrast, Mojtaba’s views, insiders say, “echo those of his father on every major topic,” from domestic repression to regional belligerence. He holds no government office, his only credential is control of his father’s household, and many Iranians openly bristle at the idea that power would simply pass from father to son. Critics point out that at 55, Mojtaba’s clerical rank of hojatoleslam is one step below ayatollah, and only last year the regime quietly promoted him to ayatollah, presumably to clear this hurdle. Even so, appointing him risks the appearance of duplicating the old monarchical order. Some inside commentators have floated a compromise: first, install a short-lived senior cleric as a placeholder, so that when he dies, Mojtaba can follow without the move looking outright dynastic.
Aside from these frontrunners, Iran-watchers note a host of other figures in the wings. The regime’s inner sanctum is crowded with veteran operators: the long-time chief of staff Majid Golpayegani, spymaster Ali-Asghar Hejazi, former presidents Ali Larijani and Hassan Rouhani, ex-diplomat Ali Akbar Velayati, and even the conservative Friday-prayer preacher Mohammad Mahdi Mirbagheri. None of these would likely rise above the frontrunners, but they are often mentioned as potential dark horses. In practice, any eventual choice still has to be ratified by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-seat clerical council whose members are handpicked by Khamenei’s Guardian Council. In Iran’s opaque system, that means the final decision will come from a body stacked with the Supreme Leader’s allies. According to Reuters, the Assembly’s confidential succession committee may now deliberate in secret on Khamenei’s nominees, possibly even choosing a council of leaders if a single successor cannot be agreed. Some analysts warn that the Guards could even press for a nominally obscure cleric with no independent power base, ensuring the absolute authority stays with the military establishment. In other words, one scenario might see a grey-haired ayatollah at the top, while the Revolutionary Guards and political factions jockey for influence behind the scenes.
The broader implications for Iran’s future have sparked debate across the spectrum. The conflict with Israel and now American air strikes have strained the regime’s resources and credibility. Many Iranians privately blame Khamenei for the economic collapse under sanctions and the decision to double down on regional adventurism.
Even some of his supporters speak quietly of his regime’s “failures,” as one academic notes Khamenei has “never been weaker” and his allies “have never been weaker.” Iran’s elite is increasingly seen as divided between hardliners loyal to the Guards, who favor confrontation, and pragmatists who hope to rebuild ties to the West once pressure eases.
This schism will also shape the succession debate. Naval Postgraduate School scholar Afshon Ostovar warns that a new leader will arrive with all factions trying to shape him; he suggests the successor will likely be chosen for being relatively weak, so that the true powerbrokers can remain in charge. Outside analysts note that if Khamenei exits by natural death, a somewhat more moderate cleric might be picked in the interest of stability, but if he is violently ousted, the regime would almost surely install a hardliner to signal continuity. One think-tank expert even speculates that Iran’s next leader might not come from the clergy at all, but be a military or security figure giving the Guards free rein. This radical departure could mark Khamenei as the last supreme leader in the traditional sense.
For now, however, Khamenei remains the unchallenged center of gravity. He still holds ultimate authority and loyalty among most institutions, and open debate about succession is officially taboo. However, even within Iran, cracks are appearing. State-affiliated media briefly acknowledged unnamed clerics pressing for “compromise” and a postwar leadership change, only to withdraw the report under pressure. Hardline commentators are already chastising “suit-wearing” moderates for negotiating the current ceasefire, suggesting a political battle is under way over Iran’s direction. Meanwhile, ordinary Iranians on the street and social media wonder anxiously who will lead them next, and how much, if at all, their country can change course once the old ayatollah steps down.
The unfolding succession drama underlines that Iran’s political future is at a crossroads. The man in the bunker has long steered Iran on a confrontational path, and the next supreme leader, whether handpicked by Khamenei or elected by his clerics, will determine if that course continues or shifts. A new leader could mend fences internationally and ease internal tensions, or harden Iran’s hand abroad and clamp down at home. One thing is sure: when Ali Khamenei finally fades from power, Iran will not be the same.
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