Who Owns the Moon? Space Diplomacy and the Rising Geopolitical Divide Over Lunar Resources

The exploration of outer space, once a domain primarily of scientific curiosity and Cold War competition, has rapidly transformed into a complex geopolitical arena, with the Moon emerging as its central stage. The renewed allure of Earth's closest celestial neighbor is driven by a confluence of factors: ambitious scientific endeavors, the tantalizing promise of valuable resources, and the undeniable boost to national prestige that accompanies lunar presence. This evolving landscape necessitates a robust framework for governance, yet the very instruments designed to ensure peaceful cooperation could paradoxically sow the seeds of division.

The New Lunar Frontier: A Geopolitical Awakening

The Moon is no longer merely a distant orb but a tangible frontier, sparking a new era of exploration that mirrors and magnifies terrestrial power dynamics. This renewed focus, often dubbed a "new space race," is fundamentally reshaping international relations beyond Earth. The strategic importance of the Moon's south pole, believed to harbor significant quantities of water ice, exemplifies this shift, transforming a scientific target into a coveted geopolitical prize.

The Moon has indeed become the centerpiece of space competition, driven by scientific imperatives, military considerations, commercial ambitions, and overarching geopolitical objectives. Projections indicate a substantial growth in the space economy, expected to reach $1.8 trillion by 2035, underscoring the escalating economic stakes. Programs such as NASA's Artemis, which aims to return humans to the Moon by 2025, and China's ambitious lunar endeavors, including historic landings on the far side, highlight the intensifying global interest. Beyond terrestrial boundaries, the access to and control over cislunar space, the region extending from Earth to the Moon, is increasingly viewed as pivotal for maintaining space dominance and national security.

A critical focal point in this burgeoning lunar interest is the Moon's south pole. This region is a prime target for most space exploration programs due to the compelling belief that its permanently shadowed craters could contain abundant water ice. The presence of water ice is not merely a scientific curiosity; it is a fundamental enabler for sustained human presence and deeper space exploration. Water can be used for drinking, cooling equipment, and, crucially, for producing hydrogen and oxygen, which are essential components of rocket fuel through in situ resource utilization, or ISRU. This capability could drastically reduce the reliance on costly and complex resupply missions from Earth, making lunar operations more sustainable and paving the way for future missions to Mars. The strategic importance of these potential resources is underscored by NASA's identification of 13 candidate landing sites near the south pole for the Artemis program, areas that China is also reportedly considering for its own missions, setting the stage for potential overlaps in operational areas.

The implications of lunar activities extend far beyond the celestial sphere, profoundly affecting geopolitics on Earth. Advances in space technology frequently lead to innovations with terrestrial applications, influencing diverse industries and economies globally. The interconnected globalized economy is, in fact, increasingly dependent on space-based satellite transmission for communication, navigation, and data transfer. This dynamic reveals a fundamental connection: the pursuit of lunar resources, particularly water ice, is not merely an economic or scientific endeavor but a direct enabler of sustained human presence and deeper space exploration. This creates a direct link between resource access and national strategic advantage, transforming the Moon into a critical component of national security and geopolitical influence. If a nation or a bloc of nations secures preferential access to these vital resources, they would gain a significant advantage in establishing long-term lunar bases and launching missions further into the solar system. This capability directly translates to strategic dominance, as control over lunar logistics reduces reliance on Earth, making lunar presence a self-sustaining strategic asset. Thus, the acquisition of lunar resources becomes a security imperative, not solely a commercial one.

Foundations of Celestial Governance: The Outer Space Treaty's Enduring Principles

At the heart of international space law lies the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This multilateral agreement serves as the foundational framework, establishing broad principles for activities in the cosmic expanse.

The Outer Space Treaty, adopted by the United Nations in 1967, is widely regarded as the "cornerstone" of international space law. Its genesis was rooted in Cold War concerns over the potential militarization of space, particularly the introduction of nuclear weapons, and its primary aim was to ensure the peaceful use of outer space. As a testament to its foundational importance, over 115 countries, including all major spacefaring nations such as the United States, China, and Russia, are parties to this treaty.

The treaty establishes several fundamental tenets that continue to shape space activities. It mandates that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, expressly prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. Furthermore, it explicitly forbids the establishment of military bases, the testing of weapons, or the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. However, it is important to note that the treaty does not explicitly ban all military activities in space, such as the placement of conventional weapons in orbit, nor does it prohibit the use of military personnel for peaceful purposes.

The treaty also stipulates that space shall be freely explored and used by all nations without discrimination. A central principle is "non-appropriation," stating that outer space and celestial bodies are "not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, utilization, use or occupation, or by any other means." This principle lies at the very core of the ongoing debate over lunar ownership and resource rights. Moreover, the exploration and use of outer space are to be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and shall be the province of all mankind. States bear international responsibility for national space activities, whether conducted by governmental or non-governmental entities, and are held liable for any damage caused by their space objects. This responsibility extends to requiring states to authorize and supervise non-governmental entities operating in space. Finally, astronauts are uniquely regarded as the envoys of humanity, and states are obligated to avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

Despite its foundational role, the Outer Space Treaty's broad language, drafted during the Cold War's state-centric era, presents significant ambiguities when applied to modern challenges. It offers no specific guidance on how its international provisions should be incorporated into domestic law, leading to varied national frameworks and a lack of cohesion in implementation. Crucially, while forbidding national appropriation, the treaty does not expressly ban all military activities in space or explicitly prohibit resource utilization, thereby creating "wiggle room" for interpretation. The rise of private companies further exposes gaps, as the treaty's state-centric principles struggle to accommodate non-state actors and ensure their compliance with international law.

This highlights a fundamental tension: the OST's prohibition on national appropriation, while clear on territorial claims, becomes ambiguous when confronted with resource extraction. The absence of an explicit ban on resource utilization in the OST has led to a legal "gray area," where some argue that extracting resources for commercial gain does not equate to claiming sovereignty over the celestial body itself. This distinction is critical and forms the core of differing interpretations among nations and private entities.

The OST explicitly bans "national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, employing use or occupation, or by any other means." However, it does not explicitly mention "resources." This silence allows for an interpretation that, while the land cannot be owned, the resources extracted from it can be. This is akin to the high seas analogy, where no state owns the ocean, but commercial fishing is permitted. The legal debate hinges on whether the act of extraction and establishing a "safety zone" around an operation, which could effectively exclude others, constitutes a "use" that amounts to "appropriation" under Article II. This ambiguity creates a fertile ground for legal disputes and competing national interests, as nations like the United States have passed domestic laws allowing private resource extraction.

A further challenge arises from the framework's enforcement mechanisms. The OST places the burden of oversight for all national space activities, including those by non-governmental entities, squarely on states. However, the rapid proliferation of private space companies makes comprehensive state supervision increasingly unrealistic. This creates a significant enforcement gap, allowing private actors to potentially operate with minimal oversight and accountability, raising concerns about safety, sustainability, and potential conflicts.

The OST mandates that states are responsible for national space activities, whether governmental or non-governmental, and must authorize and supervise them. However, the treaty "did not anticipate private space activity," and as "commercial activities multiply, it becomes increasingly unrealistic for states to provide adequate oversight." This means that while the legal responsibility lies with the state, the practical ability to enforce compliance on a rapidly expanding and diverse private sector is strained. This gap could potentially lead to a scenario where private companies, driven by profit, might skirt international law, causing environmental damage, creating debris, or engaging in activities that provoke international incidents, all while their sponsoring state struggles to maintain control.

The Artemis Accords: A Framework for the New Lunar Age

In response to the evolving landscape of space exploration and the perceived limitations of existing international law, the United States, in conjunction with NASA, introduced the Artemis Accords in 2020. These non-binding multilateral arrangements aim to provide a practical framework for civil space exploration and use in the 21st century, explicitly grounded in the principles of the Outer Space Treaty.

The Artemis Accords represent a series of non-binding multilateral arrangements that elaborate on the norms expected to be followed in outer space, particularly for lunar activities. They are explicitly grounded in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which signatories are obliged to uphold, and aim to "operationalize" its terms by fostering transparency, cooperation, and teamwork. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine articulated that the Accords are "crafted to prevent conflict before it happens" and are fundamentally "about avoiding conflict, transparency, public registration, deconflicting activities." This approach signifies a deliberate move to provide practical guidance and norms for activities under existing "hard law" treaties like the Outer Space Treaty. This strategy seeks to fill regulatory gaps and provide predictability without requiring lengthy, complex treaty negotiations.

The Accords are explicitly non-binding, yet they aim to "operationalize" the OST. This is a classic function of soft law: to elaborate on the broad principles of existing binding treaties. The rationale is that formal treaty amendments are slow and difficult to achieve, given the rapid pace of space technology and diverse interests. By creating a set of shared principles and best practices, the Accords provide a quicker, more flexible mechanism for guiding behavior and reducing uncertainty in a rapidly evolving domain, even if they lack direct legal enforceability.

The Accords promote a common political understanding regarding mutually beneficial practices in space exploration. Their core principles include a commitment that cooperative activities should be exclusively for peaceful purposes, consistent with the Outer Space Treaty. Transparency is emphasized, with signatories committing to broadly disseminate information regarding their national space policies and exploration plans. Interoperability is a key commitment, encouraging the use and development of standards for safe and robust exploration. Signatories also commit to taking all reasonable efforts to render necessary assistance to astronauts in distress. The critical nature of registration for space objects, vital for safety and sustainability, is reinforced. Furthermore, the Accords promote the open sharing of scientific data and the public release of scientific results. There is also an intent to preserve outer space heritage, including historically significant sites and artifacts.

A particularly controversial provision addresses space resources, stating that extraction and utilization can and should be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty and does not inherently constitute national appropriation. This interpretation is a significant point of contention in international space law. Additionally, the Accords provide for the operational implementation of due regard and harmful interference obligations through public information sharing and coordination via "safety zones." While these zones are intended to be temporary and respect free access, their implementation carries an inherent risk of becoming de facto territorial claims or "spheres of influence," potentially undermining the OST's non-appropriation principle. This tension highlights the difficulty of balancing practical operational needs with fundamental legal prohibitions in a new environment.

The Artemis Accords introduce "safety zones" to avoid harmful interference and promote coordination. However, critics argue these zones could become "de facto spheres of influence of a state or be subject to national appropriation." The implication is that while the Accords state these zones are temporary and respect free access, the physical reality of establishing a base or mining operation might necessitate prolonged exclusion of others from a significant area. If an entity can unilaterally determine the "reasonable" size of a buffer zone, this could effectively grant exclusive access, resembling a form of occupation, even if not a formal claim of sovereignty. This creates a direct conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the OST's non-appropriation clause, particularly Article II.

The Accords, initially launched with eight signatories in October 2020, have seen significant expansion, reaching 55 countries by May 2025, spanning Europe, Asia, South America, North America, Africa, and Oceania. Additional signatories have the option to directly participate in the Artemis program or commit to the principles outlined in the Accords. The Accords signatories also intend to share information about their activities and output with the broader space community, primarily through the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). NASA views the Artemis Accords as a catalyst for the UN to engage on issues like space heritage and resources, aiming to foster broader international dialogue.

The following table provides a comparative overview of the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement, and the Artemis Accords, highlighting their key features and points of divergence in lunar governance.

This table serves as a concise, comparative overview of the three most relevant legal and political frameworks governing lunar activities. It immediately clarifies the fundamental differences in their binding nature, scope, and, crucially, their stance on resource utilization and appropriation. For a reader grappling with the question of "Who Owns the Moon?", this table distills the core legal arguments and the geopolitical alignments, or lack thereof, that underpin them. It acts as a quick reference, allowing for easy distinction between a widely ratified but vague treaty, a more explicit but largely rejected one, and a rapidly expanding but non-binding set of principles.

Divergent Paths: China, Russia, and the International Lunar Research Station

While the Artemis Accords gather a growing coalition under a US-led framework, China and Russia are championing an alternative vision for lunar exploration and governance: the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). This parallel initiative underscores a deepening geopolitical divide in space, raising questions about the future of a unified international space law.

China and Russia are actively constructing alternative frameworks for the Moon race, having explicitly rejected the Artemis Accords. In March 2021, they formalized their cooperation by signing a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). This ambitious project envisions a comprehensive lunar base designed for multidisciplinary scientific research, exploration, resource utilization, lunar-based observation, and advanced technology verification.

Statements from Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) emphasize that the ILRS project is intended to be "open to all interested countries and international partners." This open invitation has attracted a diverse set of partners, including the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Venezuela, South Africa, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, and Thailand. Interestingly, Thailand has also signed the Artemis Accords, indicating a potential for dual participation and a hedging strategy in the evolving lunar landscape. ILRS construction missions are expected to commence after 2028.

China's lunar resource strategy is meticulously planned, involving a series of Chang'e missions leading up to the ILRS construction. These missions are designed to collect lunar samples, detect crucial resources like water ice at the south pole, and experimentally verify in situ resource utilization capabilities. The Chinese delegation maintains that any discussion of rules governing space resource activities should be firmly rooted within the framework of international space law, with the Outer Space Treaty as its basis. They consistently emphasize core principles such as peaceful use, the benefit of all humankind, non-appropriation, and international cooperation.

Despite the stated openness of the ILRS, Russia and China have explicitly criticized the Artemis Accords for being "too US-centric" and for being adopted outside the established United Nations international treaty framework. Russia's space agency, Roscosmos, has gone so far as to liken the U.S. stance on resource extraction to colonialism. Sergei Savelyev, the agency’s deputy head in charge of international cooperation, warned that "There have already been examples in history when one country decided to start seizing territories in its interests and everyone remembers how that turned out." Echoing this sentiment, Dmitry Rogozin, former Roscosmos Director General, controversially argued that "the principle of invasion is the same, whether it be the Moon or Iraq." China similarly views the Accords as a unilateral effort by the United States to shape space governance.

The emergence of these two distinct lunar initiatives highlights an intensifying "new space race" between the United States and China. Concerns persist within some circles that China's objectives might involve securing critical lunar resources and strategic territories for military purposes. However, Beijing consistently denies these claims, emphasizing the economic significance of space power. The historical stalemate under the Antarctic Treaty over China's request for an Antarctic Specially Managed Area around its Kunlun Station, which was perceived by some as an attempt to establish a degree of sovereignty, serves as a cautionary tale for the potential implications of lunar safety zones.

This parallel development of the US-led Artemis Accords and the China-Russia-led ILRS creates a significant risk of fracturing international space law into competing normative frameworks. This could lead to a "two bloc" space order, where different states operate under different rules, increasing the potential for misunderstandings, harmful interference, and even conflict on

the Moon. The Accords are criticized for being U.S.-centric and outside the UN framework, while China and Russia are building their own "open" ILRS. This parallel development, especially with the contentious issue of resource utilization, implies a lack of consensus on fundamental principles of lunar governance. If major spacefaring nations align with one framework over another, it could lead to a situation where activities deemed permissible under one set of norms are considered illegal or illegitimate under another. This "fracturing" would undermine the universality of space law, making coordination and deconfliction more challenging and increasing the likelihood of disputes over lunar territory or resources. The Antarctic analogy reinforces this concern, showing how terrestrial geopolitical tensions can translate into obstruction of consensus in shared domains.

The following table provides a comparative overview of the Artemis Accords and the International Lunar Research Station, illustrating their distinct leadership, objectives, and approaches.

This table is crucial for illustrating the emerging geopolitical competition in space. By presenting the Artemis Accords and the ILRS side by side, it visually highlights their distinct leadership, objectives, and, most importantly, their differing approaches to the contentious issue of lunar resource governance. It enables the reader to quickly grasp the "two bloc" dynamic, understand which nations are aligning with which vision, and appreciate the underlying criticisms and geopolitical stakes involved in this parallel development.

The Commercial Imperative: Private Enterprise and the Lunar Economy

The landscape of space exploration is no longer solely the domain of national governments. A burgeoning private sector, driven by technological advancements and entrepreneurial ambition, is rapidly becoming a pivotal force in the lunar economy, introducing new dynamics and complex legal questions.

The rise of private actors, including companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Lunar Outpost, and ispace, signifies a profound shift in lunar exploration. These entities are increasingly involved in a wide array of activities, from developing moon landers to providing essential rocket launch services and even actively pursuing the collection of lunar resources. This dynamic has fostered the growth of public-private partnerships, where governments strategically leverage private sector innovation, resources, and expertise while maintaining necessary oversight and strategic control.

However, this burgeoning private involvement also exposes significant legal gaps and challenges. Existing international space treaties, primarily drafted with state actors in mind during an earlier era, possess substantial shortcomings in addressing the complexities introduced by the rapidly expanding private space sector. Terms such as "national activities" and "non-governmental entities" often lack precise definitions, creating regulatory ambiguities that private companies can potentially exploit to argue they do not fall under strict oversight. While international space law dictates that all commercial activities in space must obtain the authorization and ongoing supervision of a state, and the Outer Space Treaty places the burden of oversight squarely on states to ensure private entities comply with international law, the sheer multiplication of commercial activities makes comprehensive state supervision increasingly unrealistic.

The United States has adopted a specific approach to resource rights, enacting domestic laws like the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. This act explicitly allows U.S. citizens to engage in the commercial exploration and exploitation of space resources and to possess them once extracted. This legislation is widely interpreted by industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations as a valid interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, asserting that Article II's prohibition on national appropriation does not extend to private ownership of extracted resources.

Nevertheless, the legal debate over who owns resources extracted from the Moon and asteroids remains a significant challenge. While the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation, some legal interpretations suggest that property ownership in space, even of extracted resources, is forbidden. Conversely, others contend that in international law, "unless something is expressly prohibited, it is permitted," thereby allowing for resource extraction. The 1979 Moon Agreement, which explicitly declares lunar resources the "common heritage of mankind" and prohibits appropriation by any state or non-governmental entity, has not achieved widespread ratification by major spacefaring nations, significantly limiting its legal authority in this debate.

This situation highlights a fundamental tension: the private sector's push for resource ownership often draws parallels to terrestrial "first mover advantage" and even the Homestead Act, suggesting a right to possess resources once extracted. However, this analogy overlooks critical differences between terrestrial and celestial environments, particularly the finite nature of lunar resources and the absence of a sovereign authority to grant property rights, creating a fundamental tension with the Outer Space Treaty. Snippets refer to the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, creating a "right" for private individuals to extract and possess space resources. Some in the space advocacy community even analogize this to the Homestead Act. The implication here is that while terrestrial property rights often stem from "use and occupation" or "gift of the sovereign," the OST explicitly bans national appropriation. If a nation cannot claim sovereignty, it cannot, under standard law theory, confer property rights.

While civil law theory suggests "use and occupation" establishes rights, the unique nature of space, which is considered res communis, and the finite nature of minerals, unlike replenishable fish, challenge direct terrestrial analogies. The "first mover advantage" implies a unilateral determination of "reasonableness," which could lead to de facto exclusion, pushing against the spirit of free access. This creates a legal quagmire where private commercial interests are attempting to define property rights in a domain explicitly declared beyond national appropriation, potentially leading to significant international litigation.

Commercial incentives and investment are powerful drivers in this new era. Private companies are unlikely to make the substantial investments required for lunar development without clear legal protection and a discernible path to return on their investments. The "new space race" has already attracted significant venture capital firms to the burgeoning field of space mining. However, the increasing number of private companies also raises concerns about the risk of accidents and incidents in space, further complicating the regulatory landscape. The lawsuit filed by Blue Origin against NASA's award of a lunar lander contract to SpaceX for the Artemis program vividly illustrates the intense competition and inherent legal challenges within the commercial space sector.

Who Owns the Moon? Navigating the Resource Dilemma

The question of "who owns the Moon" is not about claiming vast swathes of lunar territory in the traditional sense. Instead, it revolves around the more nuanced, yet equally contentious, issue of who has the right to extract and utilize the Moon's valuable resources, and under what legal framework. This dilemma lies at the heart of current space diplomacy.

The Moon holds significant promise for resources critical to future space exploration and potentially for Earth. Among these, water ice is believed to be abundant in shadowed craters at the lunar poles. Its strategic importance cannot be overstated, as it is crucial for sustaining human life, cooling equipment, and, through in situ resource utilization, producing rocket fuel in the form of hydrogen and oxygen. This capability could drastically reduce the need to transport supplies from Earth, making lunar operations more sustainable and paving the way for further deep space missions.

Another highly sought-after resource is Helium-3, a light isotope of helium, which is implanted in lunar regolith over billions of years by solar wind. Extremely rare on Earth, Helium-3 holds immense potential as a clean and economical fuel for nuclear fusion reactors, producing significantly fewer high-energy neutrons and substantially less radioactive waste than traditional fission reactors. Estimates suggest the Moon could harbor at least a million tonnes of Helium-3 within its first three meters of depth.

Beyond these, ilmenite and rare earth elements are also present in lunar regolith, adding to the Moon's resource allure. The extraction and utilization of these resources are increasingly seen as critical for enabling safe and sustainable space exploration and development.

The core of the "ownership" debate centers on how resource extraction aligns with the Outer Space Treaty's non-appropriation principle. Article II of the OST explicitly forbids national appropriation of celestial bodies "by claim of sovereignty, through use or occupation, or by any other means," yet it conspicuously does not explicitly mention "resources". This silence has led to a crucial interpretation by some, including proponents of the Artemis Accords, that the extraction and utilization of resources do not inherently constitute national appropriation.

This stands in stark contrast to the 1979 Moon Agreement, which explicitly declares the Moon and its natural resources the "common heritage of mankind" and envisions an international regime to govern their exploitation once feasible. However, the Moon Agreement's limited ratification, particularly by major spacefaring nations, significantly weakens its legal authority and practical enforceability.

In the absence of a universally accepted international regime for lunar resources, domestic laws have emerged. Countries like the United States and Luxembourg have passed national legislation permitting companies to extract and own space resources, reflecting an interpretation that such activities are permissible under existing international law. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, for instance, creates a "right" for private individuals to extract and possess space resources once removed from a celestial body.

Recognizing the growing complexities, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its Legal Subcommittee have established a Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities. This group is tasked with collecting relevant information, studying the existing legal framework, and identifying areas for further work, which may include the development of new rules or norms.

China, in its submission to this working group, has emphasized the importance of reaffirming and operationalizing the principle of non-appropriation, encouraging scientific investigation, enhancing coordination, and ensuring sufficient supervision of non-governmental entities involved in resource activities. The initial draft principles prepared by the Working Group reaffirm freedom of access and non-appropriation, and notably include a possible addition that extraction or utilization of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation.

Despite these efforts, the differing interpretations and the lack of a unified legal framework continue to raise concerns over potential conflicts in space. There is a high risk that early actors could monopolize key locations or resources, exacerbating existing tensions.

This situation reveals a paradox: the Outer Space Treaty's principle that space activities should be for the "benefit and in the interests of all humankind" stands in tension with the commercial drive for resource exploitation. While proponents argue that commercial activities indirectly benefit all through innovation and economic growth, critics contend that unchecked private extraction without a precise benefit-sharing mechanism could exacerbate existing global inequalities and contradict the spirit of common benefit.

The OST explicitly states that exploration and use of outer space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind". Simultaneously, the Artemis Accords state that space resource utilization "can benefit humankind" and is "critical to sustainable operations". The implication here is that while the commercial sector aims for profit, and proponents argue this drives innovation and economic benefits, the direct beneficiaries are often limited to the companies and their sponsoring states.

Without a robust international framework for equitable benefit sharing or mechanisms to ensure access for all states, especially developing ones, the "benefit of all mankind" risks becoming a hollow promise. This could lead to a "space divide", where countries without advanced capabilities become dependent on others or are excluded from the benefits of lunar resources, fueling resentment and geopolitical friction.

The Moon Agreement attempted to address this with "common heritage", but it failed to gain widespread support precisely because major powers were unwilling to commit to a benefit-sharing regime that might limit their commercial opportunities.

The following table outlines key lunar resources and their strategic value in the context of future space exploration and terrestrial applications.