Eyes in the Sky: How Satellites Are Rewriting Global Power

Above the clouds, beyond the reach of tanks and missiles, a new battlefield has emerged, silent, omnipresent, and largely invisible to the naked eye. It is a place where cameras do not sleep and machines track the movement of vehicles, troop formations, and even wildfires in real time. That battlefield is space. And in the modern geopolitical struggle, space-based intelligence and surveillance have become as critical to national security as ground forces or cyber capabilities. Satellites no longer beam down weather patterns or offer snapshots of our planet. They now shape the contours of warfare, diplomacy, and global power projection.

In Ukraine, this transformation has been unmistakable. Since Russia's invasion in 2022, the war has become the first large-scale conflict in which commercial satellite imagery has played a vital operational role. Every movement of Russian armor across a bridge or every new trench dug into Ukrainian farmland has been caught by a lens floating hundreds of kilometers overhead. These images are not taken solely by military satellites. Many of the most strategically valuable observations have come from privately owned spacecraft operated by companies like Maxar Technologies, Planet Labs, and ICEYE.

These companies, once known mainly to investors and remote sensing specialists, have become embedded in the architecture of international security. Maxar’s high-resolution images of the Russian military’s buildup outside Kyiv in early 2022 were among the first public confirmations that the invasion was imminent. Since then, the Ukrainian government and its allies have used commercial satellite feeds to track the aftermath of artillery strikes, identify mass graves, and even guide the deployment of counteroffensives. ICEYE’s synthetic aperture radar satellites have proven especially critical, capable of capturing images through cloud cover and darkness, enabling Ukrainian forces to maintain round-the-clock awareness of Russian movements. In one widely reported instance, satellite radar imagery helped identify camouflaged vehicles hidden in forested terrain, which were then targeted by long-range precision weapons.

The implications of this are far-reaching. For decades, satellite intelligence was the exclusive domain of a few wealthy states. What we are witnessing now is the democratization of surveillance from space, a shift in power dynamics. Countries without space programs of their own can now contract directly with private companies for strategic intelligence. The barrier to entry has dropped, and with it, the monopoly on orbital eyes. This has eroded the advantage that once belonged to states like the United States and Russia. Still, it has also fostered a new kind of alliance structure, one that combines national interests with corporate innovation.

The United States remains a dominant player, but its relationship with the private sector is evolving quickly. Firms like SpaceX, through its classified Starshield program, are rumored to offer the Department of Defense capabilities that rival traditional reconnaissance satellites in speed and precision. The shift from government-built satellites to fleets operated by defense contractors and tech giants has blurred the line between public mission and private profit. Elon Musk’s decision to restrict the use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine during sensitive military operations raised questions about how much control national governments truly have over the tools they increasingly rely on.

Beyond the battlefield, space-based surveillance is not just transforming the way we understand and react to humanitarian crises; it is shaping the global response. In Gaza, where access to the ground is often restricted by conflict or political barriers, satellite imagery has been used to assess damage to civilian infrastructure, monitor agricultural collapse, and track population displacement. During the 2024 conflict, observers from the United Nations and non-governmental organizations relied heavily on satellite data to confirm reports of destroyed schools, hospitals, and residential areas. The imagery helped corroborate eyewitness accounts and provided a measure of transparency in a place where traditional journalism often cannot reach. It also played a role in legal accountability. Some human rights investigations now begin not with interviews or photographs from the ground, but with orbital snapshots that show patterns of destruction or the presence of military equipment near civilian sites.

This ability to independently verify events from space gives watchdogs and journalists a new tool, but it also raises new questions. Who gets to decide what is seen? Access to high-quality satellite data is still costly, and while governments and large NGOs may be able to afford it, smaller organizations and local communities may not. Moreover, the sheer volume of data being collected, terabytes of imagery every day, means that much of what is captured may never be analyzed, or may be selectively interpreted based on political agendas. Satellites offer a new form of vision, but they do not remove human bias. The use of this technology for military purposes also raises ethical questions about the potential for harm and the responsibility of those who control these surveillance capabilities.

The race for orbital dominance is not limited to Western nations. China has poured billions into its space infrastructure and is rapidly closing the gap with the United States. Its Gaofen satellite series and BeiDou navigation system provide Beijing with indigenous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. China has also launched high-resolution optical satellites and radar platforms capable of monitoring maritime traffic, mapping terrain, and observing foreign military bases. This has enabled Beijing to assert more control over contested areas in the South China Sea and monitor developments along its border with India. China’s ambitions extend beyond mere observation. The country is developing technologies to counter or blind enemy satellites through lasers, jammers, or even “killer satellites” that can intercept and turn off adversary spacecraft.

Russia, too, maintains a significant orbital presence. Despite the technological and economic strains of its ongoing war, Moscow has continued to operate a variety of military satellites dedicated to early warning, imaging, and electronic intelligence. These platforms provide vital situational awareness over Ukraine, NATO member states, and U.S. naval operations in the Arctic and the Mediterranean. At the same time, Russia has intensified its rhetoric about the weaponization of space, accusing the West of turning orbit into a combat zone. Ironically, its space doctrine does not rule out the deployment of weapons in space.

The most complex development in this new era of orbital geopolitics may be the growing overlap between civilian and military use. Satellite systems originally developed for commercial use, weather monitoring, agricultural forecasting, and traffic analysis can now be repurposed for intelligence. A company that tracks shipping containers for logistics clients may also provide data to intelligence agencies monitoring illicit arms flows. A constellation designed to improve internet access may also relay encrypted battlefield communications. The dual-use nature of these technologies makes regulation difficult and attribution murky. This growing overlap could have significant consequences for both the commercial and security sectors, potentially blurring the lines between them and raising questions about accountability and transparency.

This convergence of civilian innovation and military strategy is one reason why governments around the world are rushing to secure partnerships with commercial satellite operators. It also explains why cyberattacks targeting satellite networks are becoming more common. In recent years, several major satellite communications providers have reported intrusions traced to state-sponsored actors. These attacks are not just about stealing data; they are about testing vulnerabilities, mapping networks, and preparing for a future where control over space assets may determine the outcome of a conflict on Earth.

As with all technological revolutions, the expansion of satellite surveillance brings risks as well as opportunities. The promise of near-perfect situational awareness could foster overconfidence among policymakers. The ability to see everything does not necessarily mean understanding everything. Context, intention, and nuance still matter.

Moreover, reliance on surveillance may erode diplomatic norms, as countries feel they are constantly being watched or outmaneuvered. In the absence of updated international agreements governing the use of space-based intelligence, misunderstandings could lead to confrontation.

The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967, was written for a very different era. It prohibits weapons of mass destruction in space but says little about surveillance, cyber operations, or commercial actors. There is no global framework governing how satellite data is collected, shared, or protected. As more states and corporations launch their satellites, the lack of regulatory oversight becomes increasingly dangerous.

In the coming years, orbital surveillance will become not just a tool of military planning but a foundation of global governance. It will shape how we respond to disasters, verify treaties, monitor elections, and assess environmental damage. But it will also become a source of tension, especially if transparency and access are not shared equitably. Space may be vast, but its strategic zones are becoming crowded. The decisions we make now about how to govern those zones will have consequences far beyond the atmosphere. The question is not whether surveillance from space will define the next chapter of geopolitics. It already does. The challenge is whether we will learn to manage that power before it manages us.

Refrences

1. Michel, Casey. “Ukraine’s Expanding Satellite Intelligence Network: How Finland and Eastern Europe Are Reshaping Modern Warfare and Surveillance.” Defense.info, August 12, 2025. https://defense.info/featured-story/2025/08/ukraines-expanding-satellite-intelligence-network-how-finland-and-eastern-europe-are-reshaping-modern-warfare-surveillance/.
2. RAND Corporation. Lessons from the War in Ukraine for Space. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, November 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2950-1.html.
3. Reuters. “Finnish Satellite Operator ICEYE to Provide Data to NATO Headquarters.” Reuters, March 28, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finnish-satellite-operator-iceye-provide-data-nato-headquarters-2025-03-28/.
4. “Satellite Images Show Extent of Gaza Destruction.” BBC News, December 15, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68006607.
5. Amnesty International Australia. “Satellite Imagery Reveals Total Razing of Khuza’a in May 2025 in Further Evidence of Israel’s Wanton Destruction and Genocide in Gaza.” Amnesty International Australia, June 10, 2025. https://www.amnesty.org.au/satellite-imagery-reveals-total-razing-of-khuzaa-in-may-2025-in-further-evidence-of-israels-wanton-destruction-and-genocide-in-gaza/.
6. Associated Press. “China Developing Laser Weapons That Could Blind U.S. Satellites, Report Says.” Associated Press, February 15, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/759e53143378357ce3af21ca8a6916df.
7. European Commission. “Commission Launches IRIS², a Secure Connectivity Programme for Europe.” Press release, April 9, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2436.
8. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Space Capabilities to Support Military Operations in the European Theatre. London: IISS, January 2025. https://www.iiss.org/publications/research-papers/2025/01/space-capabilities-military-ops-in-europe.
9. SpaceX. “Starshield.” Wikipedia, last modified June 20, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starshield.