Reimagining East Asia’s Security: The Case for an Asian NATO

Shigeru Ishiba’s proposal for an “Asian NATO” has ignited a crucial debate about the future of security in East Asia. His call comes when the region faces rapidly evolving security dynamics, primarily driven by China's increasing assertiveness, North Korea's unpredictable behavior, and broader geopolitical tensions. Ishiba's ambitious idea of forming a regional alliance akin to NATO is firmly grounded in a profound understanding of the shifting strategic landscape. His remarks underscore a critical truth: the current security arrangements, particularly the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke system that has shaped East Asian diplomacy since the Cold War, are increasingly inadequate to tackle the complexities of modern threats. As the global order becomes more multipolar, the traditional framework that relied on the United States as the central security guarantor is no longer flexible or unified enough to handle contemporary challenges. In this context, an East Asian security alliance could effectively address these concerns and stimulate regional cooperation that mirrors the region’s growing influence and evolving strategic interests.

The hub-and-spoke system has been the cornerstone of U.S. diplomacy in East Asia since the end of World War II, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War. Under this system, the United States acted as the central “hub,” with its bilateral security agreements with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others forming the “spokes.” This approach allowed the U.S. to maintain a dominant position in regional security, balancing competing interests and deterring external threats through military presence, economic influence, and political ties. However, this system was designed for a very different era. During the Cold War, it was a tool for containing the Soviet Union and, later, for managing the rise of China. In the post-Cold War era, it helped to prevent regional instability and maintain peace across the Asia-Pacific. Yet, in today’s rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the hub-and-spoke model is increasingly ill-suited to East Asia's diverse and interconnected threats.

The central problem with the current system is that it relies on a series of bilateral agreements that are often disconnected from one another. While these agreements are valuable, they lack the kind of collective, multilateral decision-making structures that would allow the region to respond more effectively to shared threats. For example, the growing military assertiveness of China in the South China Sea, its increasingly sophisticated missile and cyber capabilities, and its broader ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region demand a more coordinated and unified response. Similarly, North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile technology creates a security environment that requires seamless cooperation among all stakeholders in the region. Yet, under the hub-and-spoke system, these bilateral agreements often operate in silos, making it difficult to mount a cohesive and integrated response to challenges that transcend individual countries.

In this light, Ishiba’s call for an Asian NATO represents a necessary evolution of East Asian security architecture. The concept of a multilateral security alliance that includes countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and others offers a platform for coordinated action, joint military exercises, shared intelligence, and mutual defense commitments. Such an alliance could bridge the gaps between the existing bilateral arrangements, ensuring that regional players are not working at cross-purposes but are instead engaged in a common mission to maintain stability and security. By pooling resources, expertise, and military capabilities, an Asian NATO would be better equipped to address the full spectrum of security challenges, from conventional military threats to cyber and economic warfare. This could lead to a more secure and stable East Asia, fostering a sense of optimism about the region's future.

However, it's important to acknowledge that the concept of an Asian NATO is not without its challenges. There may be concerns about the potential for increased militarization in the region, the impact on existing security arrangements, and the potential for exacerbating tensions with China. These are valid concerns that need to be carefully considered and addressed in any discussion about the formation of an Asian NATO. The concept of an Asian NATO is not unprecedented. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), formed in 1954 during the Cold War, was an early attempt to create a multilateral security arrangement in Asia. SEATO aimed to counter the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, drawing on the collective defense principles of NATO. However, SEATO ultimately failed because it lacked cohesion among its members. The organization struggled with differences in national interests, and several key member states were reluctant to commit to mutual defense obligations. Despite its failure, SEATO provides an important historical precedent for an Asian security alliance. The lessons from SEATO’s shortcomings, particularly the need for shared strategic goals and a sense of mutual trust, could inform the design of a modern East Asian alliance.

An Asian NATO would need to build on the lessons of SEATO’s failure and focus on the diverse security concerns that characterize the region today. While SEATO’s primary objective was to contain communism, an East Asian alliance would need to address a much broader range of issues, from territorial disputes in the South China Sea to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The region’s security concerns are no longer confined to one ideology or country. Instead, they are shaped by the complex interplay of regional powers, each with their interests and priorities. This makes the need for a collective security framework even more pressing. A modern alliance would need to account for the diverse strategic interests of its members while ensuring that they are unified in their commitment to regional peace and stability. This unity is crucial in effectively addressing the region's security challenges.

Forming such an alliance would not necessarily mean the end of the U.S. role in the region. The United States would remain a critical partner in any East Asian security framework. The U.S. still possesses unmatched military capabilities and global influence, and its leadership would be essential in shaping the direction of such an alliance. However, the increasing complexity of the region’s security environment suggests that East Asian nations must be more active in managing their security. By creating a multilateral framework, these countries could share the burden of maintaining stability, reducing their dependence on the United States, and ensuring that regional decisions are made with more significant input from local actors.

Furthermore, establishing an East Asian alliance would give smaller countries greater leverage in addressing their security concerns. Nations like the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have expressed concerns about China’s growing territorial claims in the South China Sea, could benefit from the collective security offered by such an alliance. By strengthening regional ties and fostering solidarity, an Asian NATO would give these nations the support they need to stand firm against external pressures and preserve their sovereignty. For Japan, an East Asian alliance would provide additional assurances in the face of China’s increasing military capabilities and the threat of regional instability. The coalition could offer South Korea a platform for enhanced cooperation on North Korean and regional security issues.

Ishiba’s proposal comes when the U.S. reassesses its role in East Asia. The relative decline of American power, coupled with the rising influence of China, has led some to question the sustainability of the current security architecture. While the U.S. remains a key player in the region, its ability to act as the sole guarantor of peace and stability is increasingly being questioned. An East Asian alliance, while still maintaining strong ties with the U.S., could ensure that the region’s security is more self-reliant and better able to respond to emerging threats. It would also encourage the U.S. to re-engage with East Asia in a more collaborative and balanced way, recognizing the growing importance of regional actors in shaping their security outcomes.

In conclusion, Shigeru Ishiba’s call for an Asian NATO is more than just a reaction to the rising threats from China and North Korea. It is a recognition that the security architecture in East Asia must evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The hub-and-spoke system that has defined U.S. diplomacy in the region for decades is no longer sufficient to address the complex, interconnected threats that East Asia faces today. By drawing on the lessons of SEATO and building a modern, multilateral security framework, East Asian nations can create a more resilient, flexible, and cohesive approach to regional security. This would enhance the region’s ability to respond to emerging threats and empower local actors to take greater ownership of their security. As the global order shifts, it is time for East Asia to take the next step toward a more integrated, collective approach to security, with or without the United States at the center.