Western Sahara is a sparsely populated desert on Africa’s northwest Atlantic coast. Morocco administers roughly three-quarters of the land, referred to as the “Southern Provinces,” while the Sahrawi Polisario Front controls the rest in the east. This division dates back to decolonization: Spain governed the region (then called the Spanish Sahara) until 1975, when it abruptly ceded administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania. That year, the International Court of Justice had already ruled that the Sahrawi people’s future must be determined by “free and genuine expression” of the population. Instead, Morocco organized the famous Green March, dispatching about 300,000 civilians (and an army) into Western Sahara to assert Moroccan sovereignty. Mauritania soon gave up its claim (1979), and Morocco consolidated control. A United Nations brokered ceasefire followed in 1991, along with the creation of MINURSO (the UN Mission for the Referendum), which was meant to prepare a referendum on self-determination. That Referendum has never been held, and Western Sahara’s final status remains unresolved.
Over the decades, Moroccan authorities have pursued infrastructure and economic projects in the territory, while Polisario-run institutions developed in exile. Today, roughly half a million people live in and around Western Sahara. Independent observers estimate Moroccan settlers now form the majority: an estimated 350,000 Moroccans were settled in the territory since 1975, displacing on the order of 200,000 indigenous Sahrawis. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), proclaimed by Polisario in 1976, controls about 20–25% of the desert in the east; its government-in-exile in Algerian refugee camps at Tindouf maintains a 51-member legislature and an executive chosen from within Polisario’s ranks. In contrast, Morocco considers Western Sahara an integral part of the Kingdom, integrating it administratively into southern Moroccan regions. For instance, Sahrawis elect 13 representatives to the Moroccan parliament, though only candidates loyal to Moroccan sovereignty may stand. No pro-independence parties are allowed there.
Most Sahrawi refugees live in Algerian camps: as of early 2024, some 173,600 Sahrawis were registered in five camps near Tindouf. Small Sahrawi communities also exist in Mauritania, Spain, and elsewhere (tens of thousands more). Only about 90,000 Sahrawis remain identifiable in the Moroccan-administered areas, where the Moroccan census does not distinguish them from settlers. In the UN’s view, Western Sahara is “the last remaining colony in Africa,” and UN resolutions have repeatedly reaffirmed Sahrawi self-determination rights. Moroccan leaders, however, emphasize development and security.
Morocco insists it has offered a realistic solution: since 2007, Rabat has proposed granting autonomy to Western Sahara under full Moroccan sovereignty. Moroccan officials and their allies call this plan “the most serious, credible, and realistic” basis for a settlement. For example, a Moroccan delegate at the UN decolonization committee pointed out that the southern provinces showed “remarkable progress” after decades of neglect, with improved infrastructure, tourism and elections that demonstrate commitment to local democracy. Regional allies echo this line: the UAE’s UN ambassador Al Manhali explicitly stated in June 2024 that Morocco’s autonomy proposal is “the only basis for a just and lasting political solution” that preserves Morocco’s territorial unity. She lauded Morocco’s “outstanding efforts” to develop the southern provinces and reaffirmed her country’s support for Moroccan sovereignty “over all of Moroccan Sahara.” In a July 2023 UN Security Council session Morocco’s foreign ministry similarly reaffirmed that any settlement must respect “the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Kingdom” and be based on its autonomy.
The Polisario Front, by contrast, demands an independence referendum. It rejects the very premise of Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara. In its statements, the Polisario leadership refers to the territory as “the last colony in Africa,” insisting Sahrawis must enjoy an “inalienable, non-negotiable” right to self-determination. minurso.unmissions.org. Brahim Ghali, Polisario Secretary-General, was re-elected in January 2023, defeating a challenger who wanted a more forceful military stance. Polisario notes that the UN mandate promised a vote and that only the Sahrawi people can decide their fate. Its partisans point to the many Sahrawi refugees, and claim Morocco has changed the demographics through “Moroccanization” (importing settlers) and resource exploitation.
In practical terms, the territory is split by Morocco’s fortified defensive wall (the “berm”), which stretches 2,700 kilometers. Most of Western Sahara’s towns and resources lie west of the wall under Moroccan control. Polisario maintains only a lightly populated “liberated zone” east of the berm, where it stations guerrilla units and controls desert outposts. In recent years, sporadic clashes have resumed. In late 2020 Polisario declared the 1991 ceasefire void and launched limited attacks on Moroccan positions (for example in the buffer area of Guerguerat). In May 2024 it admitted firing rockets that landed outside the city of Smara. (An overview map below shows how cities like El Aaiún and Dakhla sit in the Moroccan zone, while remote areas like Smara lie nearer the contested frontier)
The map above highlights key Saharan locations. Morocco administers major cities (El Aaiún, Dakhla, Smara) on the Atlantic coast and plateau, and resource sites like the phosphate mine at Bou Craa. East of the berm, Polisario controls desert terrain near the Algerian border. Local Sahrawi activists point out that life on the Moroccan side includes infrastructure and government services, but also tight security. They say that ordinary Sahrawis in the south face heavy monitoring and restrictions: peaceful pro-independence demonstrations are banned, and symbols like the Polisario flag are outlawed. Moroccan human rights groups and UN monitors have documented arbitrary arrests of Sahrawi activists, especially following protests. For instance, after a large protest camp at Gdeim Izik near El Aaiún was forcibly dispersed in 2010, Moroccan courts (including the Court of Cassation) sentenced 53 Sahrawi men to long prison terms for the deaths of security officers, verdicts widely criticized as relying on forced confessions. Dozens of these “Gdeim Izik prisoners” remain jailed, while Moroccan authorities deny wrongdoing.
Civil liberties are tightly constrained in both the Moroccan and the Polisario zones. In Moroccan-controlled areas, any hint of Sahrawi nationalism is suppressed: organizers of cultural events or protests are frequently arrested. The United Nations reports note that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has not been allowed to visit Western Sahara for years, despite receiving continual reports of violations. Alleged abuses include police beatings of activists, unfair trials, and harassment of Sahrawi journalists. For example, the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 report noted recurring claims that Sahrawis who “advocate for self-determination” are subjected to “intimidation, surveillance and discrimination.” International NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have documented a pattern of house arrests, travel bans, and lengthy detentions of Sahrawi students, lawyers, and protest leaders. By contrast, Moroccan officials say they have improved governance and allowed socio-economic development. At UN forums, a Moroccan petitioner pointed out that large-scale projects (roads, energy plants, tourist infrastructure) and regional elections show Rabat’s commitment to integration. She insisted that turnout for local votes was high and lauded the new development model for the southern provinces.
From the Polisario camp's perspective (and that of many Sahrawi civilians), life in the Tindouf camps is hard. The Sahrawi refugees claim limited resources and political freedoms inside the camps. They point to long waiting lists for European resettlement and dependence on international aid for schooling and healthcare. In the UN Decolonization Committee in 2023, a Sahrawi petitioner described “more than 170,000” refugees in Algeria facing “economic hardship and political oppression,” as Moroccan development in Western Sahara changed the local demography. Sahrawi women activists have also accused Polisario of abuses: one former detainee alleged forced disappearances and forced marriages in the camps. Moroccan authorities, however, insist the refugees are held against their will. Morocco has frequently criticized Algeria for “paternalistic” control over the camps and the Polisario’s suppression of dissent there.
The international community remains divided. No country has rescinded support for Sahrawi self-determination. Yet, around 40 states, mainly in Africa and the Middle East, recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara or have opened consulates in the occupied zones. In late 2023 Chad became the first African nation to open a consulate in Dakhla (in Morocco’s southern region), following a deal with Rabat. In June 2024 the United Arab Emirates again affirmed it “fully” backs Morocco’s claim, calling autonomy the “only basis” for a solution and emphasizing that the entire Sahara region is inseparable from Morocco’s “territorial integrity.” Israel likewise recognized Moroccan sovereignty in December 2020. In July 2024 France broke with past policy by endorsing the autonomy approach as “the only framework” for peace. Algeria, which sponsors Polisario, was furious. In July 2024, Algeria declared France’s move a “blatant breach of international legality”. It withdrew its ambassador from Paris in protest. At the same time, the European Union’s institutions have been more circumspect: in 2024, the European Court of Justice struck down an EU-Morocco fisheries agreement insofar as it applied to Western Sahara, ruling that international law requires Sahrawi consent on trade deals.
The United Nations has kept up mediation efforts, but without a breakthrough. In October 2024, the UN Secretary-General reported that he remained “deeply concerned by developments”. It urged an immediate return to negotiations. MINURSO’s mandate was extended again (most recently for six months in October 2024). However, Morocco will not allow an independence referendum without any change in terms. Polisario insists independence remains on the table. The new personal envoy, Staffan de Mistura, visited the region in September 2023 (the first such visit by a UN envoy in decades) and later held talks with both parties. Algeria and Morocco, however, have refused to meet directly. Some analysts warn that, absent trust-building measures, the risk of new clashes is rising. The UN Secretary-General has called for a ceasefire and a search for “a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution.” Domestic politics complicate matters inside Morocco. The central government in Rabat treats Western Sahara as a national priority.
Moroccan kings regularly visit the south to inaugurate projects and meet local officials. Sahrawis are represented in Moroccan institutions by Moroccan political parties. They have used the ballot box mainly to endorse pro-monarchy candidates, since any candidate advocating autonomy or independence would be barred. King Mohammed VI’s 2015 New Development Model includes the provinces of Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra and Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab, aiming to improve roads, jobs and social services. In late 2024 Rabat unveiled more projects: for example, a new border crossing bridge at Sakia El Hamra was opened in July 2024 to speed trade with Mauritania. Moroccan press emphasizes these as signs that Sahrawis willingly benefit from Moroccan rule.
Meanwhile, Western Sahara’s indigenous political leadership, the SADR/Polisario administration, has held its elections in exile. (Polisario prohibits competing parties or dissent: Freedom House notes that in the Algerian camps, “the Polisario Front does not allow other political parties to compete” and has imprisoned opponents.) International aid agencies and NGOs continue to press both sides on rights. In late 2024, for example, Amnesty International reported that Moroccan authorities continued to prosecute journalists and activists, while Polisario-run areas still barred independent journalists. Human Rights Watch in January 2025 noted that 19 Sahrawi men remained jailed on terrorism charges related to a 2010 protest camp, convictions it called “unfair.”
The Rif Parallel: A similar story has recently unfolded in Morocco’s northern Rif mountains. The Hirak Rif protests of 2016–2017 erupted over economic neglect and political corruption in the historically Berber region, and they too saw harsh crackdowns. Dozens of Rif activists (including leader Nasser Zefzafi) were jailed on lengthy sentences amid allegations of torture. Moroccan authorities do not recognize any distinction between the Rif and the rest of Morocco, so they responded to the Hirak mostly with arrests and then promised regional development plans (e.g. infrastructure spending) to address local grievances. By contrast, Western Sahara’s conflict has an international dimension: Algeria openly supports Sahrawi self-determination and has even hosted a small Rif independence group (the Party National de Rif) on Algerian soil. In March 2024, Algeria opened an office in Algiers for this Rif party, provoking a Moroccan intelligence source to call it “more serious” than even the Sahara issue. The Moroccan government angrily denounced Algeria for sheltering what it sees as a separatist threat. In practice, however, the Rif situation remains under tight Moroccan sovereignty: the Rif movement’s leaders say they seek dignity and rights rather than outright secession, but any organized push for autonomy is firmly blocked.
In Western Sahara, however, the divide is so fundamental that comparisons often founder. Many Moroccans insist the territory is inalienably Moroccan, whereas many Sahrawis insist on their nationhood. For now, no compromise has been reached. The Moroccan side refuses a vote that could include independence, while the Polisario refuses any solution short of it. International efforts under successive UN Security Council resolutions (2602, 2703, etc.) have emphasized dialogue without preconditions. Yet concrete progress remains elusive. As one recent UN adviser said, all parties must change course to avoid “further escalation.” Meanwhile, on the ground, life continues with an uneasy status quo: Moroccan settlers and troops in the west, UN peacekeepers along the berm, and Sahrawi refugees dreaming of a return home. Observers warn that any further deterioration, from flare-ups like the 2020-24 skirmishes or a hardening of positions, could destabilize the broader Maghreb, already strained by Morocco-Algeria rivalry and the spread of nationalist sentiments.
In summary, Western Sahara today is a complex mosaic of history, politics, and human stakes. Its people are divided by barbed wire and politics and live under two systems. Moroccan voices highlight investment and integration, pointing to modern facilities and participatory elections in the south. Sahrawi voices emphasize identity and rights, decrying what they call occupation and accusing both Algeria and Morocco of using them as pawns. International stakeholders add their interests: some push Morocco’s autonomy plan as realistic; others continue to uphold the Sahrawi right to a referendum. The UN and humanitarian organizations call for better protection of civilians and fresh talks. In this standoff, there are no easy answers, only a shared sense among most outsiders that some creative political compromise, sensitive to Sahrawi aspirations, will ultimately be necessary to resolve one of the world’s longest-running conflicts.
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