According to the latest SIPRI yearbook, the world is witnessing a revival of the nuclear arms race after decades of gradual cuts. Global stockpiles rose again in 2024, ending the post-Cold War trend of reductions. SIPRI reports that all nine nuclear-armed states, from the United States and Russia to China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, are planning to increase their arsenals. In particular, China has emerged as the single fastest-growing nuclear power. SIPRI notes that Beijing has added about 100 warheads per year since 2023, making its arsenal “the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world.” In just one year, China’s count climbed from roughly 410 warheads in January 2023 to about 500 in January 2024, and by 2025 it already holds on the order of 600 warheads. These figures are still far below the Russian and U.S. stockpiles (roughly 5,500 each). Still, the pace of Chinese expansion, combined with modernization, is unprecedented. SIPRI observes that the previous era of steady nuclear reductions “is coming to an end,” replaced by a clear trend of growing arsenals, sharper nuclear rhetoric, and the collapse of old arms-control agreements.
An ambitious modernization program is driving China’s buildup. Satellite imagery indicates that China is rapidly constructing a vast new network of ICBM silos in its northwestern desert and mountainous regions. By early 2025, nearly 350 new silo launch sites had been completed or were almost complete in remote provinces, a scale of construction on par with that of the United States and Russia during the Cold War. If fully armed, these silos could allow China’s ICBM force to rival that of the two superpowers within a decade. Meanwhile, China is fielding longer-range missiles and MIRV technology. SIPRI notes that Chinese DF-5 and DF-41 ICBMs are now MIRV-capable and that if each new silo were filled with a missile carrying three warheads, China’s deployed warheads could exceed 1,200. On the sea and airside, China has almost completed upgrading its Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear submarines and is developing a new Type 096 SSBN and strategic bomber to round out a triad. In short, Beijing has moved beyond the Cold War-era “minimal deterrent” of a few dozen missiles, and SIPRI concludes that China is in a “significant phase of nuclear arsenal expansion."
China’s official line remains unchanged that its nuclear forces are intended strictly for self‑defense and kept at a minimum required for national security. However, the pace and scale of China's nuclear expansion raise concerns about the potential risks it poses to global security. At a June 2025 press briefing, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson reiterated the longstanding no‑first‑use pledge and insisted China is not engaging in an arms race. Beijing criticizes SIPRI and U.S. analyses as “biased” and “hyping” a China threat. Chinese experts point out that even if China expands to 1,500 warheads by 2035, that would still be only about a third of the stockpiles of Russia or the United States. But most analysts note that the pace of growth itself alters strategic dynamics, regardless of relative numbers. Some U.S. officials have wondered why China feels compelled to expand so rapidly, suggesting factors like Xi Jinping’s goal of a world‑class military and concern that advanced U.S. missile defenses could undermine China’s limited deterrent. The fact that Chinese warheads may now be assigned to missiles in peacetime for the first time points to a shift toward higher readiness. Taken together, these developments represent a significant test for existing arms control norms and treaties.
Indeed, China’s nuclear buildup has strained the old frameworks of nuclear arms control and non‑proliferation. As SIPRI observes, the great-power arms-control architecture is fraying on multiple fronts. The U.S.-Russia New START treaty, the last remaining limit on the strategic nuclear forces of superpowers, has effectively been suspended. In early 2023, Russia announced it would suspend participation, and the United States countered by halting data exchanges. Meanwhile, Russia has even withdrawn its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, citing the U.S. failure to ratify it since 1996. This regression is sharpening concerns over Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although China is a recognized nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, critics argue that its rapid expansion violates the treaty’s spirit by running counter to the commitment to disarmament “in good faith.” Many non‑nuclear countries attending the upcoming NPT review conference will point out that the major nuclear powers are modernizing rather than cutting weapons, undermining non‑proliferation norms. At the very least, China’s rise makes it more urgent to revisit how to make Article VI meaningful in practice.
The implications for New START and future arms control negotiations are equally profound. New START cannot constrain China by its terms, and with the U.S.-Russia tie broken, calls have grown to include China (and even India or others) in any new framework. The Biden administration has publicly urged that “all responsible countries that have [nuclear] weapons should engage in an arms control dialogue.” In 2021, President Biden and President Xi agreed to launch a bilateral strategic stability dialogue that could cover nuclear issues. Until recently, Beijing had rejected trilateral talks. Still, it signaled a willingness to discuss strategic stability after that summit. The brutal reality is that any meaningful arms-control accord must now reckon with three very different nuclear postures (and motivations), Russian, American, and Chinese, as well as rising Asian nuclear forces in India and Pakistan. SIPRI warns that today’s nuclear arms competition is “sharpened” by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have weakened diplomatic pathways. The result is an international environment where traditional agreements are in limbo: New START’s future is uncertain beyond 2026, the CTBT remains unratified, and informal confidence‑building measures have atrophied. Some experts now urge a new multilateral approach, perhaps a multi-party “P5” process or a mini-lateral summit, to create transparency and restraints involving China, the U.S., and Russia, even if progress will be slow.
The United States has already begun to adjust its nuclear strategy in response to these developments. The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review explicitly describes China as a “pacing challenge” and projects that the People’s Liberation Army could field on the order of 1,000 warheads by the 2030s. In practice, this means Washington is pursuing a massive modernization of its triad, new Columbia-class submarines, the Sentinel (formerly LRSO) cruise missile, the B-21 Raider bomber, and updated warhead production lines, to maintain a credible deterrent. The U.S. currently fields roughly 3,700 active warheads, with additional retired warheads in reserve (for a total on the order of 5,459 when counted as in [76]). As SIPRI notes, although the U.S. and Russia maintained their warhead numbers steady in 2024, both are investing heavily to replace their aging systems. U.S. policy has emphasized that it does not intend to increase its arsenal dramatically beyond these modernizations but has built higher flexibility into its deterrent. The State Department has reiterated that Washington is “ready and willing” to discuss arms control with China. Behind the scenes, however, Pentagon and intelligence analysts have voiced alarm. A senior official testified that China’s rapid buildup “raises questions about their intentions.” Former U.S. negotiators point out that China still lags far behind the U.S. Still, the worry is that a growing Chinese nuclear force could embolden Beijing’s coercive strategy, eroding the U.S. guarantee to allies.
In response, U.S. allies in East Asia have been tightening their defenses. Japan has enacted a major strategic shift, explicitly naming China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and moving toward a counter‐strike posture. Tokyo plans to purchase new long-range strike weapons (like 400 U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles) and double its defense spending to roughly 2 percent of GDP by 2027. Japan is also deepening cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense and deterrence planning, and even raising for the first time the idea of U.S. nuclear-sharing consultations to reassure Tokyo. Seoul, for its part, is substantially upgrading its military and intelligence capabilities. South Korea has committed over $1.8 billion to defense R&D through 2024, targeting advanced technologies (such as AI, space, and hypersonics) that could bolster its conventional and anti-missile defenses. The Korean government remains legally committed to non-proliferation. It relies on U.S. extended deterrence, but the public debate about a Korean bomb has resurfaced whenever tensions rise (for example, after North Korean tests or when allies seem distant). In practice, Seoul continues to work closely with Washington and Tokyo in trilateral security dialogues, signaling its intent to stay the course under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
India, too, is closely watching China. New Delhi’s arsenal is much smaller (on the order of 160 warheads compared to China’s ~600) and has been focused on countering Pakistan. However, Chinese expansion is forcing India to reconsider its approach. Analysts note that India is unlikely to attempt a numerical match with China; instead, it will accelerate the development of a more effective, diversified deterrent (a strengthened triad of missiles, submarines, and bombers). In recent years, India has fielded longer-range Agni-V ICBMs and put its first SSBN (INS Arihant) to sea, moves aimed at credibly holding parts of China at risk. There is even speculation that pressure from China might one day prompt India to reconsider its no-first-use pledge, although officially, New Delhi has defended its NFU doctrine. A Carnegie analyst warns that China’s technology transfer to Pakistan, for example, sea-based deterrent know-how, has already “complicated India’s deterrent calculus.” Most importantly, India is aligning more with the U.S. and its allies on security, as seen by closer U.S.-India military ties and India’s role in forums like the Quad. Even so, New Delhi will also balance relations with Moscow and resist being drawn fully into a Sino-U.S. nuclear bloc. Still, U.S. strategists point out that if China and the U.S. enter an overt atomic arms race, it could have unpredictable ripple effects: “Some Japan and South Korean officials have warned that they might contemplate developing nuclear weapons” if they felt abandoned by U.S. deterrence.
The overall picture is sobering. Total global inventories are at least 12,200 warheads (as of Jan. 2025), with over 9,600 deployable warheads in military stockpiles. Nearly all of the weapons on high alert belong to Russia and the United States. Yet all nuclear powers now appear committed to expansion not reduction of their forces. This reversal of fortune puts the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other arms-control institutions under strain. Many non-nuclear states are asking: if the five recognized nuclear states are racing to build, how can the NPT’s promises of disarmament and peaceful use remain credible? Diplomatic efforts to resolve crises (in Ukraine, the Middle East, Korea, etc.) all impinge on nuclear rhetoric. SIPRI summarizes: “An accelerating arms race” has arrived, and it is “hard to believe” that just two years ago, the five nuclear powers claimed a commitment to the opposite.
Looking ahead, experts offer some policy prescriptions to prevent a full-blown nuclear showdown. Most urge that the great powers must engage each other, not retreat. The Biden administration has publicly stated its willingness to expand arms control dialogues to include China. Many analysts propose reviving or replacing New START with a tripartite accord (including Beijing) that would set limits on strategic forces and incorporate robust verification mechanisms. Others recommend pursuing a P5 process (encompassing all five NPT nuclear-weapon states) to address transparency, doctrines (especially no-first-use commitments), and risk reduction. In Asia, continued reinforcement of U.S. extended deterrence remains crucial to dissuade allies from proliferation while improving missile defenses to counter any North Korean or Chinese missile threats. At the same time, non-nuclear states are likely to press the nuclear powers at the 2025 NPT review to reaffirm their Article VI disarmament steps; some may even use the newer U.N. ban treaty as leverage.
Significantly, dialogues on crisis management, such as hotlines between major capitals and military-to-military communications, should be restored or expanded to prevent miscalculations. Finally, public messaging and diplomatic efforts must reaffirm that nuclear war must never be fought, echoing the joint nuclear pledge that now seems more complicated to trust.
In sum, SIPRI’s data and other studies underscore that China’s rapid nuclear buildup has altered the strategic landscape. The result is a more complex, multipolar nuclear balance and a window of crisis. It is one of “the most dangerous periods in human history,” as SIPRI’s director warns, a time when the Cold War’s shadow looms large again. Leaders and policymakers will need to summon extraordinary restraint and creativity. Only through renewed arms-control diplomacy, credible deterrence for allies, and firm commitments to non-proliferation can the world hope to manage this uneasy new nuclear age.
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