Washington Accord: Can Trump's Mineral Diplomacy Bring Lasting Peace to Congo-Rwanda?

Published on 31 July 2025 at 15:29

The signing of the Congo–Rwanda peace agreement, officially known as the Washington Accord, took place on June 27, 2025, in Washington, D.C., and was met with considerable fanfare. U.S. officials and regional leaders alike lauded the diplomatic breakthrough, with U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, declaring it a "historic agreement" due to its unprecedented comprehensive nature. Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe echoed this sentiment, crediting President Trump's leadership as indispensable to reaching this "remarkable milestone". Even UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres commended the United States for its pivotal role, acknowledging the Accord as a "significant step towards de-escalation, peace and stability" in the Great Lakes region.  

 

Such effusive praise for an agreement in a region historically plagued by persistent, interlinked conflicts, however, immediately prompts a critical examination. The immediate celebration of the deal, while understandable from a diplomatic perspective, highlights a recurring pattern in international relations: the signing of an agreement is often presented as the culmination of peace, rather than merely the beginning of a much longer and more complex process of peacebuilding and implementation. The question that lingers beneath the diplomatic triumph is whether this Accord truly marks a genuine turning point for a region scarred by decades of intractable violence, or if it is destined to become yet another fragile, perhaps temporary, pause in a deeply entrenched cycle of instability. While U.S. diplomatic weight can undoubtedly catalyze an agreement, it does not automatically guarantee its lasting success or inherently address the profound underlying issues that have historically undermined peace in the Great Lakes region. The U.S. may facilitate the handshake, but the sustained political will and commitment to address root causes, which are internal to the area, remain the ultimate determinants of long-term stability.  

The Accord's Architecture: A Transactional Blueprint for Peace?

 

At its core, the Washington Accord outlines several key provisions aimed at de-escalating tensions and fostering regional cooperation. It mandates the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo within 90 days. It obliges the Congolese government to cease its support for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militia. Beyond these immediate security measures, the agreement also aims to establish a regional economic integration framework that involves the United States. Earlier preliminary talks on June 19, 2025, had already laid the groundwork, committing both nations to ending hostilities, respecting territorial integrity, disarming non-state groups, and facilitating the return of refugees. However, a crucial concession saw the DRC reportedly drop its demand for immediate Rwandan troop withdrawal.  

 

A closer examination of U.S. involvement reveals a strategic calculus underlying this mediation. Human Rights Watch explicitly characterized the deal as a "mineral deal first, an opportunity for peace second," aligning neatly with U.S. strategic interests and President Trump's transactional foreign policy ethos. This transactional dynamic was evident from the outset, with the DRC initiating this specific U.S. engagement in February 2025 by offering access to its critical minerals in exchange for security assistance. This approach reflects the Trump administration's broader foreign policy objectives in Africa, which prioritize advancing trade and commercial ties to boost U.S. and African prosperity, and, crucially, securing access to critical minerals not readily available in the United States. This is part of a larger strategy to counter China's growing influence over global mineral supply chains, exemplified by flagship initiatives like the Lobito Corridor project.  

 

The explicit framing of the deal as primarily a "mineral deal" and the DRC's proactive offer of resource access in exchange for security assistance establish a clear connection between U.S. economic interests and its diplomatic engagement. While such a transactional approach can provide a powerful incentive for conflict parties to engage and reach an agreement, it simultaneously raises profound questions about the depth and long-term sustainability of the peace achieved. Suppose the primary driver for U.S. involvement is securing access to resources. In that case, there is an inherent risk that sustained U.S. pressure and commitment might wane once these strategic economic objectives are perceived as met, or if the financial benefits become less pronounced. This could lead to a form of peace that is conditional on external economic interests rather than being rooted in and sustained by genuine internal political will and comprehensive peacebuilding efforts. The Trump administration's foreign policy, which explicitly emphasizes advancing trade and commercial ties while minimizing traditional foreign aid, suggests a potential prioritization where elements crucial for truly lasting peace, such as fostering inclusive governance, upholding human rights, ensuring justice, and addressing deep-seated socio-economic exclusion, might receive secondary or insufficient attention. The "correct path" for U.S. foreign policy, defined by transactional gains and strategic competition, may not fully align with the complex, multi-faceted "correct path" required for sustainable, equitable peace in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, the subtle but significant detail that the DRC reportedly dropped its demand for immediate Rwandan troop withdrawal during the preliminary talks leading up to the Accord suggests a compromise made by the DRC, potentially under pressure, to secure the broader agreement. Such a concession on a key, contentious provision from the outset could be an early indicator of potential future non-compliance or a lack of full commitment to the most challenging aspects of the deal, fueling skepticism about the agreement's enforceability and its long-term durability.  

 

Trump's Africa Gambit: Aid Cuts and the "America First" Doctrine

 

The Washington Accord must be understood within the broader context of the Trump administration's "America First" foreign policy, which has been characterized by a significant and explicit pivot from traditional foreign aid to a focus on trade and investment. This shift has manifested in dramatic cuts to U.S. foreign aid, including the freezing of over $60 billion in programs to numerous Least Developed Countries since November 2024, a list that explicitly includes both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. President Trump has justified these cuts as necessary to "eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse" within programs like USAID.  

 

However, these aid cuts have drawn widespread criticism for their severe humanitarian impact. Reports indicate halved food rations in Africa's largest refugee camps and significant setbacks in fragile regions, such as Ethiopia's Tigray. Critics have warned of potential "millions of deaths" as a consequence, and the U.S. aid agency itself has experienced considerable "upheaval" and staff departures. This transactional shift is further underscored by the significant increase in lobbying contracts awarded to countries like the DRC by Trump-linked firms, often immediately after aid freezes. This suggests a quid pro quo dynamic where access to U.S. influence and deals comes at a price. While some analysts suggest that shifting from aid to trade is "in principle a good idea," the "abrupt termination of aid has caused significant distress on the continent".  

 

The simultaneous achievement of a "historic" peace deal, for which the U.S. takes significant credit, and the dramatic, far-reaching reduction in foreign aid presents a stark and troubling contradiction. While the U.S. is lauded for its diplomatic leadership in brokering the agreement, the cuts in aid directly impact the very populations that peace agreements are ultimately meant to benefit and stabilize, such as refugees and vulnerable communities. This suggests a foreign policy that, under the "America First" doctrine, prioritizes immediate transactional gains and high-profile diplomatic wins over long-term humanitarian stability and sustainable development. The implication is that such an approach, by undermining the foundational conditions for human well-being and resilience, may inadvertently jeopardize the very peace it claims to broker, making the overall impact on regional stability questionable.

 

President Trump's policy of minimizing humanitarian aid and focusing on purely transactional relationships aligns directly with the "America First" agenda. At the same time, this approach might secure specific economic advantages for the U.S., such as diversifying critical mineral supply chains, the "abrupt termination of aid" causing "significant distress" risks severely eroding U.S. soft power, goodwill, and moral authority across Africa. Historically, foreign aid has been a crucial component of U.S. influence, fostering partnerships and stability. A purely transactional approach, especially one that appears to prioritize "minerals before justice" by linking deals to resource access while cutting aid, could foster resentment, reduce the long-term leverage the U.S. has in promoting democratic values and human rights, and ultimately undermine the very conditions necessary for sustainable peace and U.S. strategic interests in the long run. The observation that the DRC awarded a significant lobbying contract to a Trump-linked firm on the same day the administration issued an executive order freezing aid further suggests a direct and concerning connection between political access, financial influence, and foreign policy outcomes. This raises serious questions about whether U.S. foreign policy decisions, particularly those involving access to critical resources and security assistance, are being unduly influenced by private interests and political donations rather than being solely guided by strategic geopolitical considerations, humanitarian needs, or genuine peacebuilding objectives. This perceived "pay-to-play" diplomacy could further fuel skepticism about the integrity, equity, and ultimately, the long-term effectiveness of the U.S. approach to African engagement.  

The Shadow of History: Deep Roots of a Persistent Conflict

 

To gauge the true potential of the Washington Accord, it is essential to understand the deep, complex historical roots of the DRC-Rwanda conflict. Its origins trace back over three decades to the devastating aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, including some members of the defeated Rwandan armed forces and militias responsible for the genocide, crossed into eastern DRC. These groups, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), became a persistent security concern for the new Rwandan government.  

 

Rwanda's subsequent interventions, including its support for the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) in 1996 to oust President Mobutu Sese Seko, and its more recent direct support for the M23 rebel group since 2012, have consistently been driven by these security concerns. However, these interventions have often exacerbated instability in the mineral-rich eastern DRC. While the illicit trading of minerals undoubtedly finances the conflict, it is not its fundamental cause. The actual, unresolved root causes are far deeper: a pervasive lack of democracy, justice, and respect for human rights; profound social and economic exclusion; issues of land ownership; and ethnic divisions exacerbated by colonial policies. The conflict's transnational nature, with refugee flows and regionalized rebel groups operating across porous borders, means that instability in one country inevitably affects its neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees remain in the DRC, and Congolese refugees in Rwanda, a testament to the unresolved grievances. Previous peace efforts, such as the 2002 Lusaka ceasefire and the Kampala Dialogue, have often failed to achieve lasting peace because they did not adequately address these underlying issues, or because of a lack of follow-through and continued external support for rebel groups.  

 

While the Washington Accord is celebrated as "comprehensive", a critical examination of the region's history reveals that previous peace agreements have repeatedly failed precisely because they did not adequately address the deep-seated, systemic drivers of conflict. These include the persistent lack of inclusive political institutions, deeply entrenched ethnic divisions, unresolved land issues, pervasive human rights abuses, and the legacy of unaddressed grievances. Suppose the current deal primarily focuses on state-to-state security provisions and economic integration, without mandating genuine, inclusive political dialogue between governments and their respective oppositions, and without tackling systemic corruption and equitable resource distribution. In that case, it risks becoming another temporary, superficial fix. The "comprehensive" nature of the Accord may refer more to the breadth of external involvement and immediate security provisions than to the fundamental societal and political transformations necessary for truly lasting peace.  

 

Multiple sources confirm that the illicit mineral trade significantly finances the conflict. However, a critical observation is that "too many powerful actors benefit more from instability than from peace, regardless of the human costs". This statement reveals a fundamental economic disincentive for peace among certain influential elites, both within and outside the region. Even if a peace deal is formally signed, these powerful actors have a vested interest in undermining its implementation to continue profiting from the chaos, illegal mining, logging, smuggling, and extortion rackets. This creates a powerful, self-perpetuating cycle of conflict that external mediation, alone or primarily focused on state-to-state agreements and external economic interests, may struggle to break. This inherent structural incentive for conflict is a core challenge to the deal's durability.  

 

Furthermore, the presence of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees in the DRC and Congolese refugees in Rwanda is not merely a humanitarian crisis; it is a direct and persistent consequence of the conflict's historical roots and, crucially, a potential ongoing source of instability. Previous peace initiatives have often failed due to "limited consideration of issues related to displaced persons and refugees". These large, frequently marginalized populations, sometimes harboring deep grievances or associated with armed groups, can be easily remobilized, exploited, or become targets of violence. A peace deal that does not genuinely facilitate the voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees to their countries of origin through inclusive dialogue and reconciliation processes leaves a critical vulnerability that could easily undermine any hard-won peace agreement, as unresolved human displacement fuels future cycles of violence.  

A Fragile Future: Challenges to Durability and Effectiveness

Despite the celebratory rhetoric, the path to lasting peace for the Washington Accord is fraught with daunting obstacles. Foremost among these is the sheer proliferation of armed groups in eastern DRC, over 100 of them, and the region's turbulent political landscape. The agreement's success hinges on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament of non-state groups; yet, the history of non-compliance and the "pattern of denial and duplicity" from parties like Rwanda regarding groups such as M23 casts a long shadow. Sustained U.S. government monitoring and Congressional support are deemed essential to ensure compliance and to be ready to sanction officials implicated in abuses.  

 

However, the persistent threat posed by proxy groups remains a major spoiler. The "inability or unwillingness of the Congolese and Rwandan governments to rein in violence by proxy groups" is a critical weakness. The M23, despite recent agreements, remains a concern, and the growing Wazalendo coalition of armed groups in the DRC could lead to infighting and competition over strategic mining sites and roadways if their common enemy diminishes. The continued existence and activity of numerous armed groups, particularly those with alleged external state backing, such as M23 by Rwanda, and the emergence of new coalitions, like Wazalendo, represent the most significant and persistent threat to the durability of the peace agreement. The Accord's explicit provisions for the "disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of non-state armed groups" and the need for the Congolese and Rwandan governments to "rein in violence by proxy groups" are central to its success. However, historical precedent consistently shows that these commitments are rarely fully honored, often due to a lack of political will or genuine capacity. The implication is that as long as state actors can continue to pursue their interests through proxies, avoiding direct military confrontation, peace agreements will remain superficial, merely shifting the locus of violence rather than fundamentally ending it. The accurate measure of this deal's success will be the verifiable dismantlement of these proxy networks.  

 

The illicit economy, including illegal mining, logging, smuggling, and extortion rackets, presents a powerful incentive to continue conflict, often outweighing the promised economic benefits of peace. This aligns with the observation that "too many powerful actors benefit more from instability than from peace, regardless of the human costs". The success of the Washington Accord "will hinge on whether economic benefits can outweigh longstanding incentives to continue conflict". This establishes a crucial connection: economic prosperity is presented as a remedy for conflict. However, the analysis also highlights that "too many powerful actors benefit more from instability than from peace" and that the illicit economy is a major, deeply entrenched obstacle. This suggests that the promised "regional economic integration framework" must be extraordinarily robust, equitable, and rapidly implemented to create a greater and more appealing economic incentive for peace than the existing, lucrative incentives for conflict. If the economic benefits are slow to materialize or if they fail to genuinely reach and incentivize the powerful actors who profit from chaos, then the deal's economic component will fail to secure lasting peace.  

 

Previous peace initiatives have faltered due to a lack of enforcement of sanctions against perpetrators, neglect of the weapons trade, and insufficient consideration of displaced persons. Ultimately, the terms of the agreement prove unfavorable or insufficient for key conflict parties. In that case, there remains a high likelihood that countries in the Great Lakes will resort to arming proxy groups to conduct cross-border attacks, perpetuating the cycle of violence. A critical consideration emerges from the analysis of potential future conflict dynamics. If M23 and RDF hostilities decline due to the peace agreement, the Congolese army (FARDC) might pivot its military attention northward against the ADF.

 

Furthermore, the Wazalendo coalition, whose unity is currently based on fighting a common enemy, might lose cohesion, leading to internal infighting and increased competition over strategic mining sites and roadways for tax revenue. This implies that the peace agreement, while potentially de-escalating one specific front of the conflict, might not resolve the underlying drivers of violence. Instead, it could merely reconfigure or displace the conflict, causing new fronts to emerge or intensifying existing ones. The fundamental issues of competition for resources, weak governance, and the presence of numerous armed groups persist, leading to the conclusion that the deal may alter who is fighting and where, rather than bringing genuine, comprehensive peace to the Great Lakes region.  

Conclusion: A Test of Will and Wisdom

 

The Washington Accord, signed in June 2025, represents a significant diplomatic achievement for the United States, serving as a beacon of hope for a region long plagued by conflict. It means a clear commitment by the Trump administration to a transactional foreign policy, leveraging U.S. strategic interests in critical minerals to broker a peace deal and pivot from traditional aid to trade. This approach, while effective in bringing parties to the table, has been accompanied by deep cuts in foreign aid, raising questions about the broader humanitarian impact and the sustainability of U.S. engagement.  

 

However, the euphoria of the signing must be tempered by the harsh realities of the Great Lakes region's history. Decades of conflict, rooted in post-genocide grievances, ethnic tensions, illicit resource exploitation, and a pervasive lack of inclusive governance, have created a landscape where powerful actors often benefit more from instability than from peace. The persistence of numerous armed groups, the history of non-compliance by state actors regarding their proxies, and the formidable economic incentives for continued conflict all pose daunting challenges to the Accord's long-term durability.  

 

The query directly asks whether U.S. involvement represents the "correct path." The preceding analysis suggests that while U.S. mediation can be highly effective in initiating peace agreements and bringing recalcitrant parties to the table, its effectiveness for lasting peace is profoundly contingent on moving beyond a purely transactional, mineral-focused approach. For the path to be truly effective, it must adopt a more holistic and sustained strategy that actively addresses the deep-seated root causes of conflict, supports the development of inclusive governance, and maintains a robust humanitarian commitment despite potential aid cuts. If the U.S. engagement is episodic, narrowly self-interested, or fails to address the underlying structural issues, it risks merely repeating the failures of past interventions. The "correct path" is not solely about brokering a deal, but about the quality, breadth, and longevity of the follow-through, as well as the willingness to invest in the complex, non-transactional aspects of peacebuilding.  

 

The repeated emphasis throughout the available information on the need for "follow-through", "continued monitoring", and sustained "pressure" underscores a critical point: the signing ceremony, however historic, is merely the first step. The actual test of the agreement's durability and effectiveness lies entirely in the consistent and verifiable implementation of its core provisions, particularly the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament and disengagement of proxy groups. Given the historical "pattern of denial and duplicity" by some parties and the documented "inability or unwillingness" of governments to control their proxy forces, the agreement's ultimate fate will be decided not in the diplomatic halls of Washington, but in the volatile, complex terrain of eastern DRC, far from the immediate glare of international diplomatic spotlights. The paper signature is a symbol; the actions on the ground will be the substance.  

 

The central question remains: Will this agreement be a genuine turning point, signaling a lasting shift towards stability, or will it succumb to the historical patterns of non-compliance, proxy warfare, and the powerful, entrenched incentives for instability that have plagued the Great Lakes region for decades? The ultimate success of the Washington Accord will depend not merely on the initial diplomatic handshake but on sustained, comprehensive engagement that moves beyond transactional interests to address the fundamental root causes of conflict, holds all parties rigorously accountable, and creates tangible, widespread benefits for the region's people, rather than just serving external economic objectives. It is a profound test of political will, both within the region and among its international partners, and a measure of diplomatic wisdom.

 

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