The night Japan’s political terrain shifted, July 20, 2025, was not one of fireworks or fanfare, but of flickering screens, tense silence, and the electric sense that something long-dormant had stirred. In the heart of Tokyo, Shibuya’s immense crossings teemed with weekend crowds unaware that inside the more rarefied chambers of the National Diet, the old postwar order had begun to fracture. By midnight, the results were precise. Sanseitō, a party dismissed just years ago as fringe, had captured fifteen seats in the House of Councillors. The Liberal Democratic Party, which had governed almost uninterrupted since the 1950s, lost its upper house majority, and with it, the illusion of invincibility. The unexpectedness of Sanseitō's rise left many in the political sphere surprised and intrigued.
Sanseitō’s rise was not the product of luck or sudden popular awakening, but the culmination of five years of digital insurgency, ideological recalibration, and grassroots evangelism. At the center of it stood Sōhei Kamiya, a politician with no dynastic lineage and little patience for traditional campaigning. He had once been an English teacher and supermarket manager, the kind of biography that would disqualify most political aspirants in Japan’s elite-dominated system. But Kamiya’s skill was not in pedigree. It was in performance. His YouTube videos blended polemic and populism, warning of globalist conspiracies and spiritual decay, and reaching hundreds of thousands during the COVID-19 pandemic. Where other politicians depended on editorial coverage, Kamiya built a direct relationship with his viewers, many of whom felt voiceless in Japan’s stable yet unyielding consensus politics.
Founded in 2020, Sanseitō took its name from a term that roughly translates to the “Party of Do It Yourself.” The name was more than marketing. It was a rejection of institutional power and a rallying cry to the disaffected. In the vacuum left by low voter turnout, declining party membership, and growing alienation among youth, Sanseitō offered participation with purpose. Members could join the party online, subscribe to the DIY Times newspaper, and attend neighborhood seminars that doubled as strategy sessions and wellness retreats. It was part ideology, part movement, and part lifestyle brand. The grassroots nature of Sanseitō's campaign made the audience feel connected and involved in the political process.
Its leadership was not monolithic. While Kamiya dominated public appearances, a cadre of co-leaders, Yuichirō Kawa, Atsushi Suzuki, Yūko Kitano, and Rina Yoshikawa, provided organizational depth and varied appeal. Kawa brought corporate acumen; Suzuki, a reputation for policy detail; Kitano and Yoshikawa appealed to women voters and younger activists drawn to the party’s emphasis on spiritual and national renewal. The headquarters in Azabudai Hills offered a physical base, but Sanseitō’s true power lived in livestreams, QR codes, and self-organized neighborhood cells. It was a twenty-first-century party for a generation skeptical of institutions.
Sanseitō’s platform rejected the quiet centrism that had defined Japanese politics since the war. Its vision was unapologetically nationalistic, sometimes conspiratorial, and always confrontational. Immigration, in their telling, was not just an economic issue but a cultural threat. The party claimed that foreigners received undue benefits and undermined Japan’s social cohesion. They demanded tighter border enforcement, limitations on land sales to non-citizens, and the rollback of labor policies that had brought thousands of workers from Southeast Asia into Japanese factories and farms. This stance on immigration has sparked intense debate in Japan, with some supporting the party's nationalist rhetoric and others criticizing it for promoting xenophobia.
On social issues, the party positioned itself as a bulwark against what it called Western liberalism’s encroachment. Sanseitō opposed the legalization of same-sex marriage and criticized Japan’s 2023 LGBTQ Understanding Promotion Act as a rushed, foreign-inspired intrusion. The 2023 LGBTQ Understanding Promotion Act was a landmark legislation that aimed to promote understanding and acceptance of LGBTQ individuals in Japan. Supporters argued they were protecting traditional values. Opponents called it a calculated attack on minorities. In an age where Japanese politics often avoided cultural issues altogether, Sanseitō leaned into them, drawing sharp lines and clear enemies.
Defense and constitutional revision were cornerstones of the party’s platform. For decades, Japan’s pacifist constitution had been the subject of vague LDP promises and cautious reinterpretations. Sanseitō demanded more. They called for a constitutional rewrite to enable a fully sovereign military, free from what they described as the humiliations of postwar U.S. occupation. They wanted defense spending raised to three percent of GDP and U.S. bases closed. Even Japan’s long-standing non-nuclear principles were up for debate. Kamiya did not openly endorse nuclear weapons, but he repeatedly suggested they should no longer be taboo, especially given China’s growing arsenal and North Korea’s provocations.
Where Sanseitō’s views became most controversial was in their treatment of history. The party referred to World War II not as a war of aggression but as a defensive struggle for Asian liberation. It rejected widely accepted accounts of atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and the systematic use of comfort women, describing them as exaggerated or false. In their place, Sanseitō proposed a “self-respecting” historical narrative to be taught in schools, one that emphasized national pride over contrition. Critics called this revisionism. Sanseitō called it truth reclamation.
For many voters, especially those over fifty, such rhetoric was alarming. But younger voters, especially men under forty, proved receptive. Their lives had been shaped by economic stagnation, job insecurity, and a political establishment that offered little more than incremental reforms and vague promises. Sanseitō’s sharp messages and online accessibility gave voice to frustrations that had simmered for years. In the party’s digital town halls and algorithm-boosted videos, these young voters saw not just grievance but possibility.
Sanseitō’s campaign strategy blurred the lines between politics and performance. Their rallies often felt like pop-up concerts, with speakers emerging from LED-lit vans, handing out pamphlets beside tables stocked with herbal supplements and nationalist books. The party blended political messaging with lifestyle branding. Health, spirituality, and national destiny were all part of the same package. In shopping arcades and commuter train stations, volunteers in orange jackets handed out QR codes that linked to policy videos, donation portals, and upcoming local meetups. Unlike older parties, Sanseitō did not rely on the press or unions. They relied on the feed.
The election night celebrations were modest by international standards. No confetti, no victory parades. Just exhausted volunteers, smartphone screens, and a tangible sense that something had cracked. In districts where the LDP once cruised to victory, Sanseitō candidates had carved out surprise wins. In rural prefectures long ignored by Tokyo elites, their calls for decentralization and cultural pride had landed. Even in urban wards, where progressive parties had hoped to expand, Sanseitō managed to siphon off voters disillusioned by gridlock and drift.
The reactions were swift and polarized. Human rights organizations issued warnings about rising xenophobia and the normalization of conspiracy rhetoric in political discourse. Political analysts debated whether Sanseitō’s success was a fluke or the first step toward a more profound realignment. Meanwhile, Kamiya offered no apologies. In a video recorded the morning after the vote, he stood on a rooftop, the sun rising behind him, and promised this was only the beginning. The lower house, he said, would be next. Forty seats or more. Enough to bargain. Enough to disrupt.
The future of Sanseitō is uncertain. They must now navigate the complexities of actual governance, budget negotiations, and legislative coalitions. Protest votes rarely translate into policy victories, and new parties often fracture under pressure. But the psychological break has already occurred. On July 20, the center did not hold. And in its place, a new narrative began to take shape, one of cultural resurrection, historical reimagining, and political insurrection in a country long thought immune to such things. Japan’s political equilibrium, forged in the ashes of war and prosperity, had been jolted. And somewhere between the algorithms, pamphlets, and livestreams, Sanseitō found the fault line and pressed.
References
Euronews. “Far‑Right ‘Japanese First’ Party Emerges as Fourth‑Largest Opposition Force in Parliament.” Euronews, July 21, 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/21/far-right-japanese-first-party-sanseito-emerges-as-fourth-largest-opposition-force-in-parl.
Japan Forward. “Who’s Afraid of Sanseitō? Japan’s New Conservative Party and Its Policies?” Japan Forward, July 2025. https://japan-forward.com/whos-afraid-of-sanseito-japans-new-conservative-party-and-its-policies/.
JapanInsides.com. “Controversial Sanseitō Proposals That Are Stirring Outrage across Japan.” JapanInsides, July 2025. https://japaninsides.com/controversial-sanseito-proposals-that-are-stirring-outrage-across-japan-53370.
Politico. “How a Far‑Right ‘Japanese First’ Party Made Big Election Gains.” Politico, July 22, 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/22/how-a-far-right-japanese-first-party-made-big-election-gains-00469081.
Reuters. “YouTube Generation Propels Japan’s Anti‑Foreigner Politics into the Mainstream.” Reuters, July 25, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/youtube-generation-propels-japans-anti-foreigner-politics-into-mainstream-2025-07-25/.
The Diplomat. “The Rising Force of Japan’s Ultranationalist, Anti‑Immigration Sanseitō Party.” The Diplomat, July 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/the-rising-force-of-japans-ultra-nationalist-anti-immigration-sanseito-party/.
Wikipedia, s.v. “Sōhei Kamiya.” Last modified July 2025. Accessed July 29, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sohei_Kamiya.
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