The KPU's Double Betrayal: How Ukraine's Communists Aligned with Moscow

The narrative of the Communist Party of Ukraine, or KPU, is a complex tapestry woven with threads of historical imposition, ideological rigidity, and a profound disloyalty to the very nation it claimed to represent. Far from being an authentic Ukrainian leftist movement, its trajectory reveals a party more akin to an echo of Russian imperial ambition, ultimately culminating in actions that have led many to label its leadership as traitors. This is not a story of a political evolution, but rather a consistent adherence to a foundational purpose, albeit under a different guise, that has left a trail of disillusionment among those who once sought a progressive path for Ukraine.

The KPU's origins are rooted not in Ukrainian national aspirations, but in a foreign imposition. Known until 1952 as the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, or CP(B)U, it emerged in 1918 from local groups of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) in Ukraine. Its initial founders and leaders were predominantly Russian or Jewish intelligentsia, with a striking revelation that no more than seven percent of its membership at its founding considered themselves Ukrainian. The party's declared mission, as articulated at its founding conference, was to "struggle for the revolutionary union of Ukraine with Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Russian Soviet." It gained power in Ukraine not through popular indigenous support, but through the brute force of the Bolshevik occupation army, frequently relocating its headquarters to Moscow before finally cementing its control after the Bolsheviks' ultimate occupation of Ukraine. Even by 1926, after some Ukrainian groups had joined, only 19 percent of its members were Ukrainian, despite Ukrainians making up over half of the industrial proletariat. This historical reality underscores a profound, inherent contradiction: the KPU, from its very inception, was fundamentally a Russian-dominated entity imposed on Ukraine, rather than an organic Ukrainian national movement. Its later pro-Russian stance, therefore, is not a "betrayal" of its historical roots, but a continuation of its foundational, Russian-centric mission.

Any attempts to steer the Ukrainian communist project towards a genuinely national path, one that respected Ukrainian identity or resisted Russian domination, were met with brutal suppression. Consider the fate of the "Ukapisty" group, active between 1920 and 1924, who, while supporting Soviet rule, explicitly opposed Russian dominance through the CP(B)U. They attracted communists who resisted Russian control and objected to the economic exploitation of Soviet Ukraine by Russia. Yet, once their members were admitted into the CP(B)U, they were systematically purged, charged with Ukrainian nationalism, and executed by the NKVD. Similarly, internal conflicts over "Ukrainization" and the "Workers' Opposition" that emerged in 1920, advocating for greater worker control and criticizing the party's detachment from the working class, were ultimately crushed. Joseph Stalin's regime, viewing "local nationalism" as the primary enemy of centralism, abruptly halted Ukrainization in 1933–34, enforcing forced collectivization and orchestrating devastating famines, including the Holodomor, which claimed millions of Ukrainian lives. This systematic elimination of alternative, nationally oriented leftist voices ensured that the KPU, as the successor to the Soviet-era party, inherited a legacy of subservience to Moscow and an inherent hostility towards genuine Ukrainian sovereignty. The historical reality is that any genuinely Ukrainian, anti-Russian-domination left-wing movement was systematically purged and eliminated by the Soviet-era Communist Party, meaning the KPU, as its "successor," inherited a legacy devoid of authentic Ukrainian leftist nationalism, leaving a vacuum that it filled with Soviet nostalgia and Russian alignment. The suppression of internal dissent, such as the Workers' Opposition, further demonstrates a historical pattern of the KPU's predecessor prioritizing authoritarian control over authentic workers' democracy, explaining why the modern KPU would be characterized by an "irremovable leadership" and a failure to represent the working class.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Communist Party of Ukraine was re-established in 1993, led by Petro Symonenko, explicitly proclaiming itself the successor to the Soviet-era CPU and joining the Moscow-based Union of Communist Parties. This revived KPU vehemently asserted that the 1991 ban was unlawful and openly sought a "full restoration of the socialist state." Its political strategy heavily relied on leveraging "nostalgia for the Soviet Union" to garner votes, going so far as to consider the establishment of an independent Ukraine "illegal" and championing a form of "Soviet nationalism." A 1998 publication, "Historical Thesis," presented a romanticized portrayal of the former Soviet state, conspicuously omitting any mention of contentious events such as the Great Purge or the Holodomor. This selective memory, coupled with Symonenko's lament that the Soviet Union was "criminally destroyed," underscored a profound ideological inflexibility that prioritized a romanticized past over historical truth or contemporary realities. The KPU's romanticized view of the Soviet Union represents a deliberate erasure of its historical role in inflicting immense suffering on the Ukrainian people, including the Holodomor, a profound disloyalty to the Ukrainian people. This reliance on Soviet nostalgia was not merely an ideological quirk but a calculated political strategy to appeal to a segment of the population that experienced a perceived loss of stability and superpower status after 1991. This exploitation of collective memory for political gain, rather than addressing current socio-economic issues, further underscored its conservative and backward-looking nature, distinct from a forward-looking progressive left.

The KPU, initially a formidable parliamentary force, represented in the Ukrainian parliament from 1994 until 2014 and even holding the position of the largest party in Ukrainian parliamentary elections from 1990 to 1998, saw its influence steadily wane. By the 2010s, Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko observed that the party had "degenerated into a conservative and pro-Russian rather than pro-working class grouping, gradually losing its voters and membership." This decline was not simply electoral; it reflected an internal decay, characterized by an "irremovable leadership" under Symonenko, a failure to build democratic or participatory structures, and a tendency to expel dissenting radicals. Its aging core supporters and lower commitment from younger members further eroded its base. The KPU's decline from a major parliamentary force to a banned entity is directly linked to its increasingly overt pro-Russian stance and alleged collaboration with separatists following Euromaidan. This shift was not merely a consequence of decommunization laws but a response to actions perceived as undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. The transformation into a "conservative and pro-Russian rather than pro-working class" entity highlights its abandonment of traditional leftist concerns for geopolitical alignment. This internal decay, marked by a lack of democracy, an "irremovable leadership," an aging base, and an inability to connect with civil society, explains why the party became so rigid and unable to adapt. Its alliance with the "oligarchic Party of Regions" further reveals a political opportunism that directly contradicts any claim to be pro-working class. This profound internal disloyalty made it vulnerable and led it to embrace the pro-Russian separatist cause as a desperate measure.

The 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests marked a critical turning point. While the KPU initially voted for anti-protest laws, it surprisingly also voted to remove President Viktor Yanukovych from office during the Revolution of Dignity. However, the subsequent Russo-Ukrainian War revealed a deeper, more troubling alignment. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) accused the KPU of actively assisting pro-Russian separatists and Russian proxy forces, allegations the party denied. Regional party cells, however, went on to form the pro-separatist Communist Party of the Donetsk People's Republic. In May 2015, Ukraine enacted decommunization laws, banning Soviet communist symbols and criminalizing the public denial of the criminal nature of the communist totalitarian regime. These laws, combined with the KPU's alleged support for Donbas separatists, led to the party being barred from standing in elections. In December 2015, the Communist Party of Ukraine was officially banned for actions "aimed at violating Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, collaboration with Russian proxy forces, and inciting ethnic hatred." The party appealed this ban to the European Court of Human Rights and various Ukrainian courts, continuing to participate in some elections by joining umbrella groups or running candidates as independents. However, its ban was upheld, and its assets were seized by the state in July 2022, following reports that party officials supported the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This legal suppression was a direct consequence of the party's perceived actions against Ukrainian sovereignty, demonstrating the state's response to what it viewed as a profound act of disloyalty. The KPU's consistent opposition to Ukrainian integration with Europe and its advocacy for closer ties with Russia and Belarus, including joining the Customs Union and making Russian a second state language, further cemented its pro-Russian stance. This ideological position, advocating for a "restoration of good neighborly, equal and mutually beneficial relations" with Russia and Belarus, stands in stark contrast to the aspirations of a sovereign Ukraine. The KPU's actions and rhetoric since 2014, including its support for anti-protest laws and later, alleged collaboration with separatists, illustrate a consistent pattern of prioritizing Russian interests over Ukrainian national integrity.

Petro Symonenko, as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine since 1993, has been the enduring face of this controversial political entity. He served as the party's presidential candidate in multiple elections, consistently advocating a classic Communist platform. His political career included serving as a Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and as a member of the Ukrainian parliament's Constitutional Commission. However, his support sharply declined over time, from a strong second place in 1999 to fourth in 2004, and even further in subsequent elections, eventually leading to his prohibition from the 2019 presidential election due to decommunization laws. Symonenko's statements and actions since the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War have solidified perceptions of him as a pro-Russian figure, leading to accusations of betrayal. In February 2022, as the full-scale invasion loomed, Symonenko urged for a peaceful resolution, criticizing the United States and the United Kingdom for "flaring up tensions" and sending weapons to Kyiv. He questioned why the UN Security Council had not invited the Ukrainian president to report on peaceful settlements, and advocated for extinguishing the conflict through negotiations to preserve Ukraine's integrity and the interests of Donbas citizens. Yet, his party officials reportedly supported the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, leading to the upholding of the party's ban and the seizure of its assets. In October 2022, Symonenko participated in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Havana, Cuba, where he explicitly blamed the United States and the United Kingdom for the war, stating they wanted to "use Ukraine against Russia and Taiwan against China." These statements, particularly blaming Western powers for the conflict while his party was accused of supporting the invasion, have fueled the perception that he is a traitor to Ukraine. His consistent pro-Russian rhetoric, coupled with his party's alleged collaboration with Russian proxy forces, has led to his and the KPU's effective political ostracization and legal ban in Ukraine.

The accusation that the KPU and its leadership are "practically American Neocons who are just nostalgic for the Soviet Union instead" is a provocative one, yet it reveals intriguing parallels in their approach to power and international relations. While neoconservatism originated in the US among liberal hawks disillusioned with pacifism and radical politics, advocating for the unilateral promotion of democracy and interventionism, a closer look reveals shared operational philosophies. Both the KPU and neoconservatives, despite their opposed ideologies, exhibit a conviction in their moral high ground, analyzing international issues in stark, absolute moral categories. Just as neoconservatives believe in a "peace through strength" philosophy and the use of military force as a primary option, the KPU, through its support for Russia's military actions and its historical embrace of Soviet power, demonstrates a similar readiness to achieve its political ends through force. Both ideologies display a disdain for conventional diplomatic agencies and multilateral institutions, preferring a "global unilateralism" or, in the KPU's case, an alignment with a dominant power that bypasses international consensus.

The KPU's consistent pro-Russian stance and its support for Russian interventionism in Ukraine mirror the neocon tendency to prioritize ideological goals over pragmatic, country-specific analysis. The KPU's unwavering belief in the "socialist mode of production" as the inevitable future society, rooted in Marxian concepts of historical materialism, echoes the neocon belief in a predictable "arc of history" leading to liberal democracy. Both believe their system is unquestionably the best outcome for all nations and accept a moral duty to spread their ideology, even if it requires the use of military force. The KPU's deep-seated, almost irrational animosity toward the West, particularly the US and NATO, parallels the historical neocon animosity toward Russia, even after the fall of the Soviet Union. This shared characteristic of viewing foreign policy as a morality play, pitting "good" against "evil," and a willingness to replace realism with ideology, highlights a striking, albeit ironic, convergence in their operational mindsets.

In conclusion, the Communist Party of Ukraine's journey is a stark illustration of a political entity that, from its inception, was tethered to an external power rather than rooted in genuine Ukrainian national interests. Its historical role as an instrument of Russian centralism, its brutal suppression of any indigenous Ukrainian leftist aspirations, and its post-Soviet revival steeped in a romanticized and selective nostalgia for the Soviet Union, all laid the groundwork for its ultimate alignment with Russian aggression. Under the leadership of Petro Symonenko, the KPU consistently prioritized a pro-Russian agenda, advocating for closer ties with Moscow and, crucially, allegedly supporting the 2022 invasion. This trajectory, marked by a decline from parliamentary power to a banned and marginalized entity, reflects internal decay and an abandonment of any pretense of representing the working class in favor of geopolitical alignment. The comparison to American neoconservatism, while seemingly paradoxical, illuminates a shared operational philosophy: a belief in moral absolutes, a readiness to employ force, a disdain for conventional diplomacy, and a conviction in an inevitable historical outcome guided by their ideology. Ultimately, the KPU's actions and rhetoric have cemented its image not as a champion of the Ukrainian left but as a party whose loyalty consistently lay with Moscow, leading to its widespread condemnation as a betrayer of Ukraine and its people.