In the arid expanse of Darfur and amidst the shattered skyline of Khartoum, a single shard of wreckage, not long ago, told a compelling story. It was a fragment of a guided bomb, the GB50A, bearing the unmistakable stamp of Norinco, manufactured in 2024. Investigators linked its deployment from a drone operated by the Rapid Support Forces in early March, a strike that claimed the lives of at least thirteen civilians near al‑Malha. The bomb's trail led back to a Chinese factory, suggesting it reached Sudan not through direct sale, but via re‑export from the United Arab Emirates, in flagrant violation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur.
Later in March, soldiers loyal to the Sudan Armed Forces discovered 155 mm AH‑4 howitzers in Khartoum bearing Norinco serial markings. Those weapons had only been sold to the UAE in 2019, making their presence in Sudan undeniable proof of diversion via the UAE to the RSF. Amnesty International concluded RSF units were employing these robust artillery systems, even though China has consistently stated that it does not sell weapons to embargoed areas and insists its exports to Sudan are limited and lawful.
But these two dramatic instances are only the most visible signs of a wider pattern. A major 2024 Amnesty briefing documented how small arms, ammunition, rockets, rocket‑launchers, drone jammer gear and aerial bombs from countries including China, Türkiye, Serbia, Russia, Yemen and the UAE have flowed into Sudan in recent years. Many of these weapons have ended up deployed in Darfur despite an arms embargo in place since 2005 under UN Security Council Resolution 1591, which bars transfers of arms to parties in Darfur, but has proved ineffective and narrow in scope.
Amnesty and rights experts have documented the tragic toll of the conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces and the RSF, which erupted in April 2023 and swiftly escalated into one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. Tens of thousands have perished, and millions have been uprooted. The RSF has perpetrated large-scale atrocities, including ethnic cleansing and systematic sexual violence. Civilians in both Darfur and Khartoum have been the deliberate targets of operations that flagrantly violate international humanitarian law.
Satellite imagery and battlefield analysis confirmed that RSF units had established a drone base in Nyala, flying Chinese CH‑95 drones capable of long‑range missions. Those drones carried and dropped GB50A bombs or more minor variants. The RSF struck deep into government-held territory, including the port city of Port Sudan, more than 1200 km from RSF bases. These assaults exposed the rise of the RSF’s precision air capability, emphasizing a shift from SAF air dominance to a contested aerial battlefield.
General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan, the SAF’s de facto leader, responded by accusing the UAE of arming the RSF and cutting off diplomatic ties. The UAE denied the allegations. At the same time, some analysts suggested that UAE‑provided technical advisors may have assisted the RSF in operating and navigating long‑range drone missions via satellite guidance systems.
Amnesty’s findings made clear that China bears legal obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty to prevent its arms from being diverted to parties committing atrocities. By continuing to supply weapons to the UAE, despite knowledge of its record of re‑export to conflict zones such as Libya and Sudan, China risks indirect complicity. Amnesty called on China to demand guarantees or halt transfers unless re‑exports can be prevented. It also urged cessation of further UAE arms imports until violations are investigated and punished.
China’s position maintains that it abides by UN resolutions and only allows conventional weapon sales that do not destabilize the region. It has publicly declared that weapons sold to Sudan must not be used in Darfur, and that it does not ship arms into embargoed areas. Still, critics argue this is a loophole in UN Resolution 1591, which permits arms sales to the Sudanese government so long as the weapons remain outside Darfur. In practice, monitoring is minimal and diversion is easy.
Behind this tangled arms chain lies China’s broader strategic ambition: investment in pipelines, ports, and infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative to secure access to Red Sea trade routes and Sudan’s oil. Diplomatically, Beijing promotes neutrality and calls for peace. Still, economic ties to Khartoum are deep. Analysts warn that by focusing on stability over accountability, China has enabled a regime that continues to commit rights violations.
It is not only Amnesty that reports the arms flow. UN panels of experts have long documented Chinese‑made shells and ammunition in Darfur. Government reports showed that over half of Sudan’s small arms imports in the early years of conflict came from China. China repeatedly objected to the publication of UN embargo monitoring reports, claiming they were flawed. At the same time, diplomats said Beijing sought to block findings or demand rewrites. But the data remained consistent: large volumes of Chinese arms have been used in Darfur despite the embargo.
By mid‑2025, the international community remained largely inactive. The UN Security Council had not extended the Darfur embargo to encompass all of Sudan. Both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have called for robust enforcement mechanisms and stringent arms licensing standards under ATT articles 6 and 7, which mandate states to reject transfers where there is a significant risk of misuse. They have also urged the control of dual‑use exports, civilian rifles, ammunition, and blank guns that could swiftly be weaponized in conflict zones.
Meanwhile, the war grinds on. RSF continues to operate from bases across western Sudan, armed with artillery and drone systems linked to Chinese origins. SAF retains pockets of control but lacks sufficient aerial capacity to challenge RSF’s reach fully. Civilian lives remain trapped in a deadly geometry of external arms suppliers and weak international mechanisms. This is not a tale of arms trafficking by rogue elements. It is a story of high‑level export chains, state‑owned enterprises, and strategic state interests colliding with treaties intended to stop precisely this kind of suffering.
For now, the skies above Darfur and Khartoum remain a room of smudged records and unpunished violations. The weapons raining down bear Chinese markings, but their path from factory to battlefield transformed international legal obligations into moral vacancies. Until states enforce treaties rather than debate them, the arms will come, the conflict will continue, and vulnerable civilians will continue to bear the consequences.
Add comment
Comments