Courting the Neighborhood: China’s Strategic Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on a strategically crucial diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia this week. His primary goal is to bolster China's regional influence and present Beijing as a dependable and stable partner amidst the escalating trade tensions with the United States. His visit, which commenced on April 14 in Hanoi, Vietnam, signifies the beginning of a multi-country tour that will include stops in Malaysia and Cambodia through Friday. This tour is taking place at a particularly sensitive juncture, just days after U.S. President Donald Trump temporarily paused reciprocal tariffs on most countries for 90 days, narrowing his administration’s increasingly aggressive trade war focus squarely on China. The backdrop of these developments adds a layer of urgency and strategic calculation to Xi’s journey as he seeks to capitalize on the uncertainty surrounding Washington’s policies and expand China’s economic and political footprint in one of the world’s most trade-reliant regions.

Upon his arrival in Vietnam, Xi was met with a warm reception and an official welcome that reflects the growing interdependence between the two communist-ruled nations. In recent years, Vietnam has emerged as a rising manufacturing hub in Asia, attracting significant Chinese investment as companies move supply chains out of China to offset rising labor costs and hedge against U.S. tariffs. Trade between China and Vietnam nearly doubled between 2017 and 2024, and today, Vietnam stands as China’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. These economic ties have become increasingly crucial for both countries, especially as the U.S.-China trade conflict shows no signs of de-escalation. Recognizing this, Xi is expected to sign roughly 40 agreements with Vietnamese leaders during his visit, covering a wide range of sectors, including railway construction, agricultural trade, digital infrastructure, and green technology cooperation.

One particularly notable project is Vietnam’s recently approved $8.3 billion railway connecting the northern port city of Haiphong to southern China. Chinese loans will partially fund the railway, a project under Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative, launched in 2013, aims to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future. The railway project is emblematic of Beijing's ambitions in Southeast Asia, where infrastructure investment often serves as both economic stimulus and geopolitical leverage. Vietnam is also negotiating to purchase China’s domestically manufactured mainline passenger aircraft from state-owned aerospace firm COMAC. This move would further integrate the two countries’ economies and signal confidence in Chinese technology exports.

In a signed article published in Vietnam’s Nhan Dan newspaper, Xi appealed for regional unity and multilateral cooperation. He emphasized the shared interests of China and Vietnam in preserving global trade norms and resisting protectionism. Echoing the language of internationalism and mutual benefit, Xi wrote that “our two countries should resolutely safeguard the multilateral trading system, stable global industrial and supply chains, and open and cooperative international environment.” The article, circulated widely by Chinese state media, reinforced Xi’s strategic message: China, not the United States, is now the principal guardian of free trade and regional economic stability.

This message carries significant weight in a region still reeling from the whiplash of Trump’s erratic tariff policies. Vietnam and Cambodia, in particular, were among the hardest hit by the previous round of U.S. tariffs, with rates reaching as high as 46% and 49%, respectively, before the temporary pause. While Southeast Asian governments are eager to deepen economic ties with China, they remain wary of appearing too close to Beijing, which could jeopardize ongoing negotiations with the U.S. over tariffs and trade access. The tightrope these countries must walk is further complicated by longstanding tensions with China, especially in contested maritime zones like the South China Sea.

These geopolitical undercurrents were on full display earlier this year when Chinese naval forces held live-fire drills in the Gulf of Tonkin, referred to in China as the Beibu Gulf, just weeks after Hanoi published a new official map asserting Vietnamese territorial claims in the disputed waters. Although economic cooperation between the two countries is deepening, such military posturing injects volatility into an otherwise pragmatic relationship. Xi acknowledged these complexities in his op-ed, urging both sides to “properly manage differences and safeguard peace and stability in our region.” He pointed to past successes in resolving land and maritime boundaries as a model for future diplomatic efforts, suggesting that mutual respect and dialogue can overcome even longstanding disputes.

While the visit has a clear economic focus, it is also a strategic maneuver in China’s broader effort to recalibrate its foreign policy amid growing international skepticism and a more confrontational posture from the United States. According to Wen-ti Sung, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, Xi’s high-profile presence in the region is designed to convey reassurance and solidarity to governments unsettled by Washington’s unpredictable trade actions. “What Xi is trying to do now is to go there in person,” Sung observed. “Instead of fear and pressure, Xi will show them love, maybe some ‘souvenirs’ along the way.” These “souvenirs” are expected to take the form of infrastructure investment, trade pacts, and new strategic partnerships, all aimed at signaling that alignment with China is safe and beneficial, thereby fostering optimism among the audience.

The visit also comes when China’s regional economic clout reaches new heights. Since 2023, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has overtaken both the U.S. and the European Union as China’s largest export market, according to Chinese customs data. This growing trade interdependence gives China additional leverage in shaping the region’s future direction and diminishes the effectiveness of American attempts to isolate or contain Beijing through economic pressure. Xi’s trip thus serves as a reminder of China’s enduring regional appeal, even as its global reputation remains battered by tensions with Western democracies.

Xi’s Southeast Asia tour is calculated to bolster China’s influence during global realignment. By presenting himself as a champion of free trade and regional development, Xi is not only responding to Trump’s tariffs but also actively working to redefine the rules of engagement in Asia’s geopolitical theater. The reception he receives and the agreements that materialize from this visit, particularly in Vietnam, will offer critical insight into the shifting balance of power in the region and the extent to which Southeast Asian nations are willing to lean into China’s orbit, even at the risk of straining ties with the United States. As China's largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, Vietnam holds significant influence in the region, and Xi's visit is a strategic move to solidify China's position.

Yet it cannot be forgotten that this growing tilt toward Beijing is not entirely organic; in many ways, it is a byproduct of necessity rather than preference. The Trump administration’s punitive trade measures have left many Southeast Asian countries in a bind, forcing them to seek alternatives that may not align with their long-term strategic interests. Leaders in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Kuala Lumpur have repeatedly signaled that while economic ties with China are pragmatic, their citizens remain wary of Beijing’s assertive behavior, especially in maritime disputes and through projects that risk fostering debt dependency. Rather than offering a compelling alternative, Washington's erratic trade policy and diplomatic disengagement have created a vacuum that Xi Jinping is too eager to fill.

Ultimately, what Xi presents as benevolence is often seen locally as strategic coercion wrapped in the language of partnership. The reality is that many Southeast Asian nations would prefer a more balanced regional order that allows them to engage economically with both China and the United States without having to choose sides. However, Trump’s “America First” doctrine has inadvertently boxed them in, leaving China as the only significant power actively investing in long-term regional infrastructure and multilateral engagement. As a result, what may appear as deepening regional consensus with China is more accurately a reflection of geopolitical resignation, an alignment born not of enthusiasm but of constrained choices.